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1  Introduction
Over the past three decades, systematic discrimination 
against the Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority 
from Myanmar, has compelled hundreds of thousands 
to seek safety in countries such as Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Following sectarian 
violence in Rakhine State (formerly Arakan) in 2012 
there has been a steady rise in the number of Rohingya 
people fleeing by boat from the Bay of Bengal 
(UNHCR, 2015a). What has been called ‘the largest 
regional outflow of asylum seekers by sea in decades’ 
(ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, 2015: 
4) culminated in May 2015 when a crackdown on 
trafficking in the region caused smugglers to abandon 
their boats, leaving thousands of desperate, emaciated 
people adrift in the Andaman Sea (ibid.). 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia initially pushed the 
boats that reached their shores back out to sea, but 
eventually capitulated to international pressure and 
agreed to allow the asylum-seekers to stay for one year 
(Ministerial meeting, 2015).1 This was a temporary, 
tenuous solution to a protracted refugee situation, the 
roots of which lie in the systematic persecution of, and 
denial of citizenship for, Rohingya people in Myanmar, 
the glaring absence of a cohesive regional framework 
for migration (ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human 
Rights, 2015)2 and the failure of countries in the 
region to accede to key conventions (most notably the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol, the 1954 Convention relating 
to the Status of Stateless Persons, and the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness).3 
This Working Paper presents the findings from the first 
case study of a two-year research programme designed 
to generate insight into the lives and livelihoods of 
refugees in protracted displacement. It adds to a 
growing range of evidence gathered through previous 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) research on forced 
migration and livelihoods, including publications 
on urban displacement, protracted displacement, 
vulnerability and livelihoods (cf. Crawford et al., 
2015; Metcalfe et al., 2012; Haysom and Sarraj, 2012; 
Levine, 2014). The study is built on the assertion that 
efforts over many years to engage in more participatory 
ways with refugees have not succeeded in ensuring that 
interventions are planned and implemented such that 
they accord with their lives, perspectives and priorities.4 
The study was broken into two phases and companion 
reports. This report presents findings from the first 
phase of the study only, which consisted of interviews 
with refugees in Malaysia. The aim of the report is to 
improve understanding of refugees’ livelihoods, goals, 
constraints and opportunities, and how they perceive 
their institutional landscape (defined as people, 
groups, organisations and elements of the social 
system). A subsequent, companion report will be 
released later in 2016. Building on findings contained 
in this report, and based on findings from the second 
phase of research, the second report will consider 
the perspectives of members of the host environment 
(employers, the authorities), the institutions relevant to 
refugees and the policy context more broadly. 
The report is structured as follows. The remainder 
of this chapter describes the methodology of the 
study, while Chapter 2 provides background on 
the situation in Myanmar, and the journey to and 
situation in Malaysia. Chapters 3–7 present findings 
from interviews with Rohingya refugees in Malaysia 
– Chapter 3 focuses on the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs, Chapter 4 on the 
1 Five regional meetings were held in 2015 regarding the 
response to refugees and migrants travelling by boat: on 20 
May in Malaysia, 29 May in Thailand, 2 July in Malaysia, 27–28 
November in Indonesia and 4 December in Thailand (UNHCR, 
2016a). 
2 See Annex 1 for a list of relevant treaties and the states in the 
region that have acceded to them.
3 While signing these conventions may not guarantee a 
fundamental or immediate shift in the way states respond to 
refugees, the conventions provide internationally recognised 
legal frameworks to inform appropriate policy development 
and enable international and non-government actors to apply 
pressure on states that have signed but do not adhere to the 
commitments set out in the Conventions.
4 See, for example, outputs from recent consultations with 
refugees and other aid recipients across the Middle East (WHS, 
2015), from which emerging critique suggests ‘aid agencies are 
partial, unaccountable and potentially corrupt, and they fail to 
meet refugees’ most pressing needs’ (Redvers, 2015).
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Malaysian authorities, Chapter 5 on refugee and host 
communities, Chapter 6 on the economic activities of 
refugees, and Chapter 7 on durable solutions. Chapter 
8 concludes the report. 
1.1 Methodology
Numerous reports contain pertinent evidence regarding 
the situation for refugees in Malaysia, much of which is 
in the form of descriptive analysis on laws and policies. 
This Working Paper takes a different approach. It aims 
to improve understandings of the lives of refugees 
in Malaysia by generating insights into their goals, 
livelihood strategies, activities and outcomes; who/
what supports and constrains them; and how refugees 
perceive the institutional landscape that surrounds them. 
The analysis is, first and foremost, focused on the lives  
of individual refugees: from such micro-analysis macro-
level themes emerge, including how laws and policies 
affect refugees’ lives and how or where advocacy and  
interventions can be targeted to better serve the needs  
of refugees. Refugees in Malaysia are part of an increas-
ingly urbanised global refugee population: at least 59% 
of all refugees now live in urban areas, and this number 
is rising (Crawford et al., 2015:1). Protracted refugee 
crises are also the norm (Zetter and Long, 2012): 
‘once displaced for six months, refugees have a high 
probability of finding themselves in displacement for 
at least three years and often much longer’ (Crawford 
et al., 2015: 1). Given the very strong likelihood that 
Rohingya refugees arriving in Malaysia today will 
remain in the country long enough to be considered in 
protracted displacement, we refer to all refugees who 
participated in this study (even those who recently 
arrived in Malaysia) and the Rohingya population in 
Malaysia as a whole as being in protracted displacement. 
Nearly a quarter of the refugees interviewed for this 
study had lived in Malaysia for over 20 years, the 
longest having lived there for 31 years.
This study employs an exploratory, qualitative research 
approach. Lines of inquiry are broadly focused on 
gaining insight into the different priorities refugees have 
over the course of their displacement, the strategies they 
use to meet them and how their priorities and strategies 
change during displacement. Specifically, our aim is to 
generate evidence on and better understanding of:
•	 The	displacement	life	histories	of	Rohingya	
refugees in Malaysia, including employment 
opportunities, goals and constraints and 
perceptions of the institutional landscape.
•	 The	people,	networks	or	institutions	that	have	been	
most relevant to refugees in meeting their goals at 
different stages of their displacement. 
•	 The	role	of	informal	actors	in	providing	assistance	
and protection.
The study approach and methodology were strongly 
informed by a Working Paper (Levine, 2014) which 
elucidates the challenges associated with using 
sustainable livelihoods conceptual frameworks to 
inform practical livelihoods research, and provides 
pertinent guidance as to how this can be done. 
Specifically, Levine (2014: 15) calls for ‘more attention 
to be focused on people’s perceptions of their world 
and what it is possible for them to do; to their 
objectives; to non-economic aspects of livelihoods; and 
for a much clearer focus on people’s multiple identities 
(related to gender, ethnicity, age, etc.)’, all of which 
were key considerations in the conceptualisation and 
execution of this case study. The operational map for 
research using a sustainable livelihoods framework 
developed by Levine (2014) is presented in Annex 2. 
Following a review of relevant literature in the form of 
articles and reports related to refugees, refugee livelihoods 
and the Malaysian context,5 fieldwork for the case 
study was conducted in Kuala Lumpur in June 2015. 
Interviews were conducted with 27 refugees to explore 
their life histories from the time they were displaced from 
Myanmar to the present. Interviews were conducted in 
the Rohingya language with Rohingya interpreters. Prior 
to the start of each interview the purpose of the study was 
explained to each participant and informed verbal consent 
obtained. The names of refugees quoted in this report 
have been changed to protect their identity. 
While the researchers developed a comprehensive 
interview guide to inform the type of questions asked 
during interviews, a flexible approach to questioning 
was employed to enable refugees to discuss issues 
and events of importance to them. Purposeful, 
maximum variation sampling based on pre-established 
criteria (including age, gender, employment status, 
vulnerability status and length of displacement) was 
used to recruit a diverse sample. However, the sample 
is not exhaustive or necessarily representative of the 
refugee population as a whole. 
5 The authors requested up-to-date figures from UNHCR regarding 
Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, but none were provided.  
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According to the 1951 UN Convention on the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR, 2010:14) a 
refugee is someone who fears persecution due to 
‘Reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having 
a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it.’ An asylum-seeker is someone who 
is forcibly displaced, has crossed an international 
border and claims to be a refugee, but has not 
yet had his or her claim adjudicated. Refugees 
and asylum-seekers (such as Rohingya refugees 
in Malaysia) may also be considered stateless, 
defined in the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Statelessness Persons as ‘a person who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the 
operation of its law’ (UN, 1954: 3).
This study considers as refugees those who have 
fled across an international border in a context 
where there is general international recognition of 
a mass movement of refugees (i.e. groups likely 
to be considered prima facie refugees). The actual 
legal status of individuals was not used to restrict 
the sampling or focus of the study. 
The notion of refugee protection is used in this 
paper in accordance with the meaning ascribed to 
it by UNHCR, which uses it to
denote the extent to which a conducive 
environment exists for the internationally 
recognized rights of refugees to be respected 
and their needs to be met … in most refugee 
situations, protection space is not static, but 
expands and contracts periodically according 
to changes in the political, economic, social 
and security environments (UNHCR, 2009: 4).
This report does not purport to portray the ‘protec-
tion environment’ for refugees in Malaysia: rather, 
it highlights what refugees identified as critical 
protection challenges, and explores the direct and 
indirect effects these challenges have on the lives 
of different refugees. 
Box 1: Terminology
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2.1 The situation in Myanmar
There are an estimated 1–1.5 million Rohingya people 
in Myanmar,6 primarily in Rakhine State (ERT, 2014), 
as well as a large diaspora in Bangladesh, the Gulf 
States, Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia (Kiragu 
et al., 2011). While the ancestral heritage of the 
Rohingya can be traced back hundreds of years, if 
not longer (HRW, 2012, 2013; Yin, 2005), the ethnic 
identity and claims to citizenship of the Rohingya 
are heavily contested by citizens and politicians in 
Myanmar (ibid.; see also Euro Burma Office, 2009), 
most of whom reject the term Rohingya and refer to 
the population instead by the derogatory term kalar 
or ‘Bengali’ (the implication being they are migrants 
from Bangladesh). The Myanmar Citizenship Law, 
amended in 1982, excludes the Rohingya from the list 
of recognised national ethnic groups (Cheung, 2011; 
Ullah, 2011). The law rendered them stateless and 
‘formed the legal basis for arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment’ (Brinham, 2012: 40). 
Longstanding discrimination against the Rohingya 
has contributed to waves of displacement and 
conflict, most recently between Rakhine and 
Rohingya people in 2012. The conflict included 
rioting, looting, arson, rape, violence and the internal 
displacement of Rohingya and other Muslims (HRW, 
2013). Many Rohingya displaced in 2012 remain in 
camps. Although often referred to by the media and 
international actors as ‘communal violence’, such 
terminology masks what is alleged to be a systematic 
pattern of violence against the Rohingya; according 
to Human Rights Watch (HRW), which extensively 
documented the violence and its aftermath, ‘[t]he 
criminal acts committed against the Rohingya and 
Kaman Muslim communities in Arakan [Rakhine] 
State beginning in June 2012 amount to crimes against 
humanity carried out as part of a campaign of ethnic 
cleansing’ (HRW, 2013: 11).
These recent conflicts must be set against a backdrop 
of longstanding, systematic human rights violations 
against the Rohingya, including ‘restrictions 
on freedom of movement, marriage, education, 
employment and economic livelihood, land and 
property ownership, freedom of religion and other 
basic facets of everyday life’ (HRW, 2013: 77). 
In 2014, the following statement was issued on 
behalf of Tomás Ojea Quintana, then UN Special 
Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar:
the pattern of widespread and systematic 
human rights violations in Rakhine State may 
constitute crimes against humanity as defined 
under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. He believes that extrajudicial 
killing, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-
treatment in detention, denial of due process 
and fair trial rights, and the forcible transfer 
and severe deprivation of liberty of populations 
has taken place on a large scale and has 
been directed against the Rohingya Muslim 
population in Rakhine State (United Nations, 
2014: para. 51).
Desperate conditions in Myanmar have contributed 
to the number of Rohingya fleeing the country; 
as a recent report by ASEAN Parliamentarians 
for Human Rights (2015) states, appalling living 
conditions, severely restricted rights, exclusionary 
policies and hopelessness are compelling an 
increasing number of Rohingya to flee to 
neighbouring countries in search of better lives for 
themselves and their families.
2.2 Fleeing Myanmar: the boat 
journey to Malaysia
The research for this report was undertaken in June 
2015, shortly after a crackdown on people smuggling 
in Thailand led smugglers to abandon the ships and 
transit camps they used to transport Rohingya from 
Myanmar to Malaysia via Thailand (Associated Press, 
2 Background 
6 It is difficult to enumerate the number of Rohingya people 
in Myanmar. In the 2015 census, the first in Myanmar for 30 
years, only Rohingya people who agreed to be identified as 
Bengali were counted – those who identified themselves as 
Rohingya were excluded (Heijmans, 2015).
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2015).7 In defiance of international law, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand initially pushed the boats 
that reached their shores back out to sea. On 20 
May 2015, under international pressure and intense 
media scrutiny, the three governments issued a joint 
statement (Ministerial meeting, 2015) granting 
asylum-seekers temporary shelter, provided that the 
international community resettle or repatriate them 
within one year. While resettlement of all asylum-
seekers within a year was clearly unachievable, the 
statement enabled the three governments to protect 
their reputation while not substantively changing 
their policy and practice on refugees. The agreement 
helped alleviate immediate concerns surrounding the 
boats, but was ultimately a temporary solution to a 
protracted, escalating refugee crisis. 
Refugees interviewed reported being held on 
overcrowded boats or in camps run by smugglers in 
Thailand, denied sufficient food and water, subjected 
to verbal and physical abuse, kidnapped while 
seeking to reach Malaysia on their own, tortured, 
sold into slave labour and forced to borrow large 
sums of money to pay smugglers.8 Many arrived 
in Malaysia traumatised, sick and owing enormous 
debts to family, friends or smugglers. Unsurprisingly, 
refugees expressed hatred and fear of the smugglers, 
while recognising that they were instrumental in 
facilitating the journey to Malaysia. When asked 
what he would advise a Rohingya person thinking of 
making the journey from Myanmar to Malaysia, one 
refugee said: ‘I would advise them not to come here. 
If you are still stubborn and you insist on coming 
you will die on the sea. If you don’t die on the sea 
you will die here – you cannot live and work well 
here’. According to another: 
a lot of people will die on the sea or be killed 
by agents. It’s better if you die there than come 
here. Also if you come here you will be in 
trouble. If you come here we will need to pay 
to release you from the agents, and if we cannot 
pay you will die at his hands. I heard of people 
floating on the sea, kept in the jungle, people 
dying, women being raped. 
Local authorities along the smuggling routes are 
complicit in people smuggling of refugees and 
migrants, right from the beginning in Myanmar 
(Fortify Rights, 2014) all the way to Malaysia (Equal 
Rights Trust, 2010). 
2.3 The situation in Malaysia 
As of February 2016, 158,510 refugees and asylum-
seekers were registered with UNHCR in Malaysia.9  
The vast majority are from Myanmar, and of these 
44,870 are Rohingya (UNHCR, 2016b).10 It is 
considered to be an entirely urban population, as 
there are no refugee camps in Malaysia. The majority 
of refugees are concentrated around the capital, 
Kuala Lumpur, and the surrounding Klang Valley, 
though there are also sizable populations in other 
areas of the country, including Penang, Johor and 
Malacca.  Malaysia does not have a legal, policy or 
administrative framework for responding to refugees 
There is no standard terminology to refer to the 
people paid by Rohingya asylum-seekers to 
arrange their passage from Myanmar to Malaysia, 
and the lines between smuggling and trafficking 
are blurred. They have been referred to at various 
points by refugees, media, NGOs and the UN by 
different names: agents, smugglers, kidnappers 
and people traffickers. While recognising that, 
depending on individual circumstances, each 
of these distinct terms could be applicable, we 
use the term ‘smugglers’, in accordance with the 
UN definition of the smuggling of migrants as 
the ‘procurement, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of 
the illegal  entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident (UNODC, 2004: 54).
Box 2: Smugglers, traffickers, kidnappers? 
7 For detailed analysis of the boat exodus and subsequent 
experiences of Rohingya asylum-seekers in Indonesia, see 
Amnesty International (2015a).
8 A recent large-scale investigation in Thailand has led to a court 
case involving 91 suspects, including senior police and military 
officials and local politicians (Bangkok Post, 2016).
9 UNHCR estimates from 2013 suggest there are an additional 
49,000 asylum-seekers from Myanmar in Malaysia who had yet 
to be registered (UNHCR, 2013b).
10 The remaining refugee population is comprised of Chin and 
people of other ethnicities from Myanmar, as well as refugees 
from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Palestine 
and other countries. In light of significant differences within and 
between these refugee communities – and variance in UNHCR 
policies towards them – this report focuses solely on Rohingya 
refugees to enable more nuanced analysis.
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(i.e. it does not receive, register, document or conduct 
refugee status determination for them); the Malaysian 
government does not provide direct protection or 
assistance to refugees on its territory, and efforts to 
promote a refugee law and policy are ongoing.
A 2012 report evaluating the implementation of 
UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in Malaysia (Crisp et al., 
2012: 1) aptly describes the context for refugees, stating:
Malaysia can be considered as a ‘country of 
asylum’ only in a loose sense of that concept 
… While they are generally not at risk of 
refoulement11 or deportation, refugees in 
Malaysia have been and continue to be at risk 
of arrest, detention, extortion and corporal 
punishment, although the frequency of such 
incidents has diminished in recent times. Official 
restrictions prevent refugees from working in 
the formal sector of the economy, accessing 
healthcare on the same basis as nationals and 
attending Malaysian schools.12 
The Malaysian government has considered, and 
in multiple instances publicly announced (most 
recently in late 2015) (Kumar, 2015), the creation of 
temporary work permits enabling Rohingya refugees 
to undertake legal employment in Malaysia. However, 
these schemes have yet to be successfully adopted 
and implemented – the 2006 plan to issue 10,000 
temporary work visas, for example, was halted after 
a few days amidst corruption claims (Cheung, 2012; 
Needham, 2011; Hoffstaedter, 2015). As it stands, the 
tenuous legal status of refugees in Malaysia renders 
them vulnerable to employment-related abuse and 
exploitation, including non- and partial payment of 
wages, verbal abuse, arbitrary dismissal, physical 
abuse, sexual harassment and workplace raids (Smith, 
2012). Refugees have little recourse to address these 
problems, and most incidents go unreported.
Refugees also struggle to access health and education. 
UNHCR (2015b) estimates that only 40% of refugee 
children of school-going age have access to any form 
of education; as refugee children are prohibited from 
attending government schools, most education is 
provided through informal learning centres supported 
by UNHCR, NGOs, faith-based organisations and 
refugees themselves. While refugees with UNHCR 
cards (see below, Chapter 3) are able to receive 
treatment at government health facilities, the cost is 
often prohibitively high and those without UNHCR 
cards have extremely limited options for accessing 
secondary care. Lastly, as Malaysian law (including 
the Federal Constitution of 1957 and the Malaysian 
Immigration Act 1959/63) do not provide refugees 
a legal right to remain in the country, refugees are 
at risk of exploitation, arrest and detention. While 
refugees from Myanmar used to be at higher risk of 
deportation/refoulement, this has decreased markedly 
since 2009 (AI, 2010), possibly in part as a result 
of advocacy efforts by national and international 
organisations. None of the refugees interviewed for 
this study had been deported since 2008. An increasing 
number of refugees are being detained, however: as of 
31 December 2015, 2,498 Rohingya were in detention 
in Malaysia, 53% more than the 1,634 detained at the 
end of 2014 (UNHCR, 2016a).13 
Irregular maritime movements in 2015 highlight 
the extent of mixed migration flows (of forced 
and economic migrants) in the region. In 2010, 
Malaysia had 2–4 million foreign workers, 1.8m of 
whom were registered migrant workers who entered 
Malaysia legally, and an additional 1–2m who were 
undocumented/irregular (World Bank, 2013).14  
Most economic migrants in Malaysia come from 
Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, India and the 
Philippines (Government of Malaysia, 2016a). The large 
number of regular and irregular economic migrants and 
mixed migration flows affect state and organisational 
responses to refugees in Malaysia – these issues are 
explored in the forthcoming companion report.11 Refoulement is defined as ‘the act of forcibly returning 
persons to places where they may face persecution or other 
serious human rights violations. It also includes the act of 
sending refugees and asylum seekers to a country that does 
not guarantee protection for refugees. The principle of non-
refoulement is a norm of customary international law. In 
Malaysia, “soft deportations” have been known to take place 
along the Thailand–Malaysia border where refugees, asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants have been unofficially refouled, 
or deported from Malaysia, often into the hands of smugglers 
and traffickers’ (ERT, 2014: 17).
12 For detailed analysis on the situation of refugees in Malaysia, see 
Amnesty International (2010); ERT (2014); Smith (2012).
13 Undocumented asylum-seekers are at higher risk of being 
detained than those with UNHCR cards. The increasing number 
of Rohingya refugees in detention in 2015 coincided with a large 
increase in Rohingya refugees arriving in Malaysia in 2014–15 
(UNHCR, 2016a); most new arrivals remain undocumented until 
they can register with UNHCR, a process that can take years.
14 Since 2011, the Malaysian government has attempted 
to regulate the number of irregular migrants through the 
6P programme, which involves various stages including 
registration, legalisation, amnesty, monitoring, enforcement and 
deportation (Government of Malaysia, 2016b).
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I am grateful that UN gave me a document, but 
disappointed because they have not helped my 
family. 
3.1 Operating environment for aid 
organisations
Malaysia is a very restrictive environment for non-
governmental organisations. Few international 
NGOs are able to register in Malaysia: Amnesty 
International’s Malaysia branch application to be 
registered has been rejected six times by the Registrar 
of Societies (International Center for Non Profit 
Law, 2014), though it has been able to register as a 
business. Several international organisations (they 
prefer not to be named) faced similar difficulties 
with registration, initially working through partner 
organisations before seeking to register as a business.  
Some local and national NGOs have been reluctant 
to provide services for refugees, fearing a backlash 
from the government for working with ‘illegal’ 
populations. In addition, national NGOs supporting 
refugees tend to be ‘limited in their capacity and 
highly dependent on UNHCR support’ (Crisp et 
al., 2012: 11). In interviews, when refugees were 
asked who had helped them over the course of their 
displacement they mentioned only three NGOs 
providing assistance to refugees in Malaysia. The 
first was Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) or 
the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia. Founded 
in 1971, ABIM’s support for Rohingya people dates 
back to the late 1990s (Utusan Online, 1998). 
Refugees credited ABIM with helping Rohingya 
communities organise to facilitate their registration 
with UNHCR in the early 2000s. The second was the 
Taiwanese Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation, which runs 
a free health clinic (amongst other programmes) used 
by a number of Rohingya refugees interviewed. The 
third was a Myanmar refugee-run NGO, Myanmar 
Refugees Activists (MRA), which had on several 
occasions provided refugees interviewed for the study 
with rice, oil and other home essentials, as well as 
paying for refugee children to attend school. 
The vast majority of refugees in Malaysia do not 
receive formal assistance. Very few receive any form 
of aid; according to one study by the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC), 92% of refugee 
respondents said neither they nor a member of their 
household had received humanitarian aid or services 
during the previous year (Smith, 2012: 61). Despite 
the limited aid available to refugees in Malaysia, the 
Malaysian government expects refugees’ needs to be 
met by the international community – while at the 
same time erecting obstacles that impede assistance: 
‘Malaysia considers the task of providing refugees 
with protection, assistance and solutions to be the 
responsibility of the international community in 
general, and UNHCR in particular, rather than that 
of the state’ (Crisp et al., 2012: 11). 
With limited NGO and state involvement, UNHCR 
has become the most prominent and influential 
formal institution in refugees’ lives, serving not only 
as the gatekeeper to registration and resettlement, but 
also the most visible potential provider of financial, 
livelihoods, protection and health support. UNHCR 
has provided protection and related assistance for 
Rohingya and other refugees for decades: it has 
operated in Malaysia without a branch office or 
other formal agreement since 1975, and currently has 
a major office presence in Kuala Lumpur. UNHCR 
registers newcomers and other asylum-seekers under 
its mandate, and in recent months has focused on 
registering asylum-seekers in immigration detention 
and seeking their release. Several thousand persons 
of concern were released from immigration detention 
in 2015. However, financial and other resource 
constraints limit the degree and quality of assistance 
UNHCR can provide, and efforts to encourage greater 
government, community and civil society support 
for refugees and building capacity within refugee 
communities is an ongoing, long-term process. 
3 Networks and institutions:  
 UNHCR and NGOs 
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3.2 Registration and UNHCR 
cards
The vast majority of Rohingya are unable to obtain 
a passport or citizenship document in Myanmar, 
and arrive in Malaysia with a Myanmar identity 
document or no documents at all. The primary (and 
often only) identity document used by refugees in 
Malaysia is a UNHCR card. As of February 2016, 
158,510 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered 
with UNHCR in Malaysia (UNHCR, 2016b), of 
whom 44,870 were Rohingya. In order to obtain 
a UNHCR card, asylum-seekers must apply to be 
registered by UNHCR, and then wait to be given an 
appointment. Asylum-seekers can also be registered 
during UNHCR visits to immigration detention 
centres or through referrals from NGOs of asylum-
seekers who have particular protection and assistance 
needs.  
There is no standard application form for registration. 
Instead, refugees are encouraged to fax or post a 
letter with their biodata (full name, date and place 
of birth, ethnicity) and a photograph to UNHCR; 
there is no mechanism to inform refugees whether or 
not their letter has been received. While refugees can 
approach the UNHCR office without an appointment 
this is discouraged, and only in very exceptional 
circumstances (e.g. when an asylum-seeker meets 
certain criteria) can an asylum-seeker be registered and 
issued with a UNHCR card on the same day. 
  
A significant number of asylum-seekers are waiting 
to be registered with UNHCR – recent UNHCR 
estimates suggest there are 35,000 unregistered 
‘persons of concern’ in the country, though a Rohingya 
community leader consulted for this study thought 
the figure was far higher. Registration processes and 
procedures that were opaque to the refugee population 
to begin with have, in recent years, been in flux. This 
is evident in cycles of mobile registration that have 
historically targeted only certain ethnicities (namely 
Chin refugees from Myanmar), a temporary embargo 
on registering non-urgent cases for parts of 2013–14 
while new registration procedures were established, 
and changing criteria regarding who is deemed an 
extremely vulnerable asylum-seeker warranting urgent 
registration. While UNHCR’s current approach to 
registration prioritises undocumented asylum seekers 
in detention and people with added vulnerabilities 
(such as those with serious medical conditions, 
unaccompanied and separated children), thousands of 
refugees who do not meet vulnerability criteria remain 
unregistered. 
The reason for this large number of unregistered 
Rohingya stems, in part, from the fact that UNHCR 
Malaysia has faced budget cuts in recent years. As 
a result, both refugees and UNHCR staff in Kuala 
Lumpur ‘find themselves under considerable pressure’ 
(Crisp et al., 2012: 20). Beyond capacity and resource 
issues, registration is very politically sensitive: 
amongst other things, the relative protection it 
affords refugees can be seen as a pull factor that 
potentially draws more migrants to Malaysia. The 
reluctance of UNHCR to significantly scale up 
registration therefore also reflects a concern not to 
jeopardise the organisation’s position in Malaysia (an 
issue discussed in greater detail in the forthcoming 
companion report on the policy context surrounding 
refugees in Malaysia).
3.2.1 Refugees’ approaches towards 
registration
There is widespread lack of understanding within the 
Rohingya community of how registration works and 
who is prioritised for registration. While for some 
the registration process is relatively straightforward, 
the examples below illustrate that for others, trying 
to obtain a UNHCR card can be a long, frustrating 
exercise, one that appears to be dependent on opaque 
criteria, timing and, to a certain degree, luck.
While research in four African cities found that 
‘receiving refugee status is not a good indicator of 
someone’s substantive experience nor does it have 
a strong effect on welfare or security’ (Landau and 
Duponchel, 2011: 2), refugees interviewed for this 
study perceived refugee status to be of significant 
importance. Being registered facilitates access to 
services unregistered people are not entitled to. For 
example, only those who are registered can apply 
to UNHCR for financial and medical assistance, 
access medical treatment at government hospitals 
and seek resettlement in a third country. Despite 
the challenges and delays many asylum-seekers face 
in getting registered, the benefits associated with 
registration – and the difficulties they confront 
when unregistered – compel them to try. One 
elderly man, who had arrived in Malaysia two 
years earlier with his wife and 16-year-old son, 
expressed the desperation he felt as an unregistered 
asylum-seeker:
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I feel a lot of tension and think of suicide. 
I worry if my son is stopped while outside 
collecting recyclables he will be arrested because 
he has no documents. I am very worried about 
arrest and life in Malaysia in general. 
When asked how he managed that stress and tension, 
he replied:
My only hope is to be registered and resettled 
by UNHCR. I don’t think there is anything 
that can make life in Malaysia easier except 
being recognized as a refugee by UNHCR. 
We have applied many times, and I feel very 
sorry because UNHCR hasn’t ever replied. 
Some of the people recognized by UNHCR 
have not suffered as much as we have – we lost 
everything. When we arrived here UNHCR 
neglected us. 
Refugees interviewed for this study employed a 
diverse range of methods to get themselves registered 
with UNHCR. Many had followed the standard 
procedure, sending letters or faxes to the UNHCR 
office and waiting to be called. Rohingya refugees 
often submit typed letters in Bahasa Malaysia or 
English, but as most are unable to create these 
themselves they get a community member or 
Rohingya organisation to produce them, and in some 
instances serve as interlocutors with UNHCR. This 
route was successful for one elderly refugee who 
arrived in Malaysia with his family three years ago:
When we arrived in Malaysia we were sitting 
on the roadside when a Malay man with a car 
saw my family. We were crying, and I tried 
to explain to him that we were ‘Myanmar’. 
The Malay man told us there was UNHCR 
in Malaysia, and drove us to the UN office 
the next morning. We waited four hours to 
be seen outside the UNHCR gates but were 
not allowed in. Then we met the secretary 
of a Rohingya community organisation who 
agreed to take us to a community shelter. The 
organisation gave us a recommendation letter 
and we eventually got an appointment with 
UNHCR and our cards after 8–9 months.  
Another interviewee, a 40-year-old man who had been 
in Malaysia for ten years, had tried a similar strategy 
but to no avail: 
I tried to get a UN card many times. I got 
recommendation letters from all of the 
Rohingya organisations – around 15. I have 
tried many times to contact the UN, I send 
letters to them six days a week and the 
Rohingya organisations said they sent letters.
Other refugees were not aware that they should 
submit a letter to UNHCR, and when they asked 
other Rohingya people they had been advised to 
try other strategies. Ruhul, a refugee man with 
disabilities (described further in Box 3) was advised 
to lie outside the gate of the UNHCR compound 
to try and get registered by soliciting pity based on 
his disability. Another refugee had been in Malaysia 
for six years, and while his aunt had submitted 
his name to UNHCR for registration the office 
had never called him. He said he intended to get 
a UNHCR card but did not know how, and when 
he asked Rohingya community members how to 
get registered ‘they told me I had to pay RM2,000 
($450) and the UN will call me – they never told me 
any other way’.15   
The lack of understanding among some refugees of 
UNHCR registration procedures, inability to obtain 
registration by refugees who conformed to UNHCR 
registration procedures and allegations of misconduct 
within the refugee registration process has serious 
implications, including undermining refugees’ trust 
in UNHCR processes, and leaving many without the 
basic protection afforded by a UNHCR card.
3.3 Access to services
A UNHCR card is needed in order to access certain 
services and assistance from UNHCR, as well as 
public services such as healthcare at government 
hospitals. One man interviewed had a UNHCR card, 
but his wife and children (who had come to Malaysia 
years after him) were unregistered, despite having 
applied to UNHCR. He described the impact this had 
on their family, saying: 
We would be grateful if UN was concerned about 
our situation. We think with UN cards our lives 
15 Public accusations of systemic corruption have been levied at 
UNHCR Malaysia, most prominently in an investigative report 
by Al Jazeera (2014). UNHCR (2014b) launched a formal 
investigation into the accusations; at the time of writing, no 
findings from the investigation were publicly available.
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would be very different – the children could go 
to school and my wife could leave the house and 
go for medical treatment. I have a UN card and 
would like my children to have one.
Ruhul, a 30-year-old father of five, arrived in 
Malaysia in January 2015. He has been seriously 
disabled since birth, but he is able to ambulate 
and perform work with his hands. Ruhul worked 
as a watch and umbrella repairer in Myanmar, but 
having found no market for such work in Malaysia, 
and unable to find any other employment, he has 
resorted to begging on the street. He begs every 
day, which earns him barely enough to subsist 
and has left him wholly unable to repay the debt 
he owes for his journey to Malaysia, or to meet 
his goal of sending money back to his family in 
Myanmar. Police have confronted him numerous 
times while he was begging: as he cannot speak 
Bahasa Malaysia (also commonly referred to as 
‘Malay’), other Rohingya people nearby translate 
for the police, who have consistently stolen the 
money he earned begging and threatened him 
with arrest.
Ruhul fears being arrested and believes it is 
important to get a UNHCR card, so he went to 
UNHCR to be registered. However, when he 
was there the guards just gave him the address 
for an NGO health clinic and did not allow him 
in. Since neither UNHCR nor other refugees 
advised him to apply via fax or letter, he has 
not done so. Instead, some Rohingya refugees 
suggested he approach the office directly, and 
advised him to lie outside the gates of UNHCR 
every day until eventually someone took pity on 
him and agreed to register him. Ruhul is afraid 
to try this as he had been beaten repeatedly 
by the people smugglers in Thailand and he 
perceives the guards as similar authority figures. 
He also cannot afford to pay transport costs to 
and from the UNHCR office. Without a UNHCR 
card ‘I am scared I will be arrested and sent to 
[an immigration detention centre]. I am scared 
not only for myself but because I have a family 
to support.’
Box 3: Ruhul’s story Some refugees interviewed for this study explained how 
they had received support from UNHCR, including 
referrals to community-based organisations (more in 
Chapter 5) and financial assistance to pay for medical 
treatment. One refugee interviewed, a young man 
who had arrived in Malaysia acutely malnourished 
and suffering from beriberi after being held by people 
smugglers, had been abandoned outside the gate at the 
UNHCR compound; he was issued a UNHCR card the 
same day, which enabled him to be admitted to hospital 
and receive supportive care during his long recovery. 
In general, refugees knew little about UNHCR 
programmes such as health insurance and how to access 
financial services.16 They also had limited understanding 
of UNHCR’s relationship with government services. 
For example, in terms of health care government policy 
states that refugees with a UNHCR card are entitled 
to a 50% discount off the ‘foreigner’s rate’ on medical 
bills at Malaysian public health facilities (this does not 
extend to those waiting to be registered). Some refugees 
misattributed the discount to UNHCR paying half of 
their bill, rather than being granted the fee-rate to which 
they are entitled. 
While UNHCR provides financial assistance (short-
term cash payments) and medical assistance (payment 
of medical bills) for a certain number of refugees, 
refugees said that accessing this assistance was difficult. 
Some refugees did not understand the criteria used to 
determine who received assistance and who did not; 
others had written letters or approached the office 
requesting financial or medical assistance, but never 
heard back from UNHCR regarding whether they 
would receive it. One refugee interviewed described the 
difficulty he had communicating with UNHCR and 
trying to receive help for a heart condition:
UN has not provided me with any assistance. I 
sought assistance at UNHCR, and had hoped 
that providing a doctor’s note would support 
my request, but the UN just told me they 
would reply and never did. I have gone more 
than 24 times to seek assistance for my health 
conditions, but have never received any. 
16 One financial institution in Malaysia has allowed some registered 
refugees, with a personalised letter of support from UNHCR, to 
open a bank account. It can, however, be challenging (obtaining 
UNHCR registration and the support letter, finding a branch that 
agrees to accommodate refugees, etc.), and most refugees 
keep their cash savings in their homes or in community savings 
arrangements.
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He goes to a government hospital, where he gets 50% 
off as per the refugee discount. As the staff now know 
him, they allow him to pay a portion up front and the 
outstanding bill later when he cannot pay the whole 
bill in full. 
It should be noted that, while refugees technically 
require a UNHCR card to access services such as 
government hospitals, some unregistered asylum-
seekers employ alternative tactics to access the 
services they need. One community leader had, over 
many years, developed a good relationship with his 
local government hospital, as a result of which the 
hospital occasionally accepted unregistered asylum-
seekers if they had a letter showing they were 
registered with a Rohingya community organisation. 
Ali, a refugee who worked for an NGO that 
assisted refugees, gave another example. He had 
been approached by a Rohingya  refugee who had 
been turned away from hospital because she was 
unregistered and could not pay the deposit. Ali found 
a donor who agreed to pay the hospital deposit, and 
gave the hospital his business card, saying he would 
take financial responsibility for the refugee. When it 
was time for her to be discharged the bill was very 
high and Ali did not have enough money to pay it, 
so he advised the refugee to abscond and helped her 
leave the hospital without paying. 
These examples illustrate how, in the absence of 
access to and protection from formal institutions 
such as UNHCR, ‘informal’ actors – in this case 
refugee communities themselves – have sought to 
negotiate access to institutions (such as public health 
facilities) and protection from perceived risks (such 
as those associated with the authorities). While 
these approaches can be successful, they are innately 
riskier, relying much more heavily on luck, personal 
circumstance and having the right connections.
3.4 Refugees’ perspectives on 
UNHCR
Interviews with Rohingya refugees revealed conflicting 
perspectives regarding UNHCR: seeing it as both 
a potential source of help, while also being critical 
of it. Refugees perceived UNHCR’s reasoning for 
not providing support as poorly explained and 
communicated, leading to a pervasive sense of 
confusion about what would and would not work in 
seeking assistance. This issue has been well documented 
in previous work; Nah (2010), for example, describes 
the perspectives of refugees in Malaysia: 
Refugees have ambivalent feelings about 
UNHCR, and this is manifested in the way 
they behave in and around its compound. Any 
appeal for help, small or large … usually entails 
hours of waiting at the Annexe, sometimes a 
whole day. This is a humiliating process, and 
refugees have expressed their dislike of it, saying 
that they ‘feel like beggars’. Refugees often 
complain that they cannot get the attention of 
UNHCR officers and that they have to visit the 
UNHCR office several times before they receive 
any help or response.
 
Almost all of the refugees interviewed conveyed this 
sense of frustration about UNHCR’s decisions and 
policies. Half of them were waiting for responses from 
UNHCR about registration, resettlement or assistance. 
‘The answer we get is “we will call you, we will call 
you”. Always the same answer’, said one Rohingya 
man. Refugees did not understand why they did not 
receive responses or why requests for registration, 
resettlement or financial support were delayed or 
rejected. Moreover, aside from one refugee who had 
participated in a microfinance programme supported 
by an NGO/UNHCR, none of the refugees interviewed 
mentioned receiving direct livelihood support (such as 
vocational training and job placement) from UNHCR 
or an NGO. Rather, refugees relied on their own 
networks and strategies to find employment. 
Difficulties accessing information as well as 
services from UNHCR contributed to ill-feeling. 
Some refugees formulated their own reasoning 
or explanations for UNHCR decisions (such 
as hypothesising that UNHCR privileged other 
ethnicities from Myanmar), while others chose 
not to request any help from UNHCR even when 
faced with life-threatening issues. For the latter, 
their own experiences, or those of others in their 
networks, of unsuccessful attempts at receiving 
assistance from UNHCR led them to form the 
perception that they were unlikely to receive help. 
For some, any potential benefits were not worth 
the costs associated with seeking assistance (such 
as transport fees to and from the office, risk of 
encountering authorities en route to the office and 
the financial and time cost of missing work to 
approach UNHCR for assistance). 
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As a result, Rohingya refugees in Malaysia feel a 
sense of helplessness and lack of control over their 
future. UNHCR is a dominant authority in their lives, 
similar to a government body, but one they struggled 
to lobby or engage with. UNHCR looms large in their 
institutional landscape, but when no help is provided 
few know where to turn; as one elderly refugee said: 
‘When we arrived here UNHCR neglected us. Why 
it happened like that? I feel so sorry. I cannot see the 
future, and I cannot go back to Myanmar’. 
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I have had problems with authorities. I was 
stopped by the police just two days ago. The 
police look down on us as refugees, they said 
we are inhuman.
Malaysia’s policies pertaining to refugees are very 
restrictive – this is particularly evident in employment 
(refugees are unable to work legally in Malaysia), 
education (refugees cannot attend Malaysian schools), 
healthcare (only registered refugees can access public 
health services) and arrest and detention. 
4.1 Interactions with the 
authorities
As refugees are technically considered to be in 
Malaysia illegally, they are at risk of arrest and 
detention by local authorities,17 particularly those who 
are not yet registered with UNHCR. A study by IRC 
(Smith, 2012: 58), which surveyed 1,003 refugees from 
Myanmar, found that 42% reported that at least one 
member of their household had been arrested in the 
last year, nearly all because they did not have identity 
documents. The majority of refugees interviewed 
for this study had personally experienced arrest and 
detention or altered their lifestyle and habits (such as 
not leaving the house or avoiding travel beyond their 
neighbourhood) due to fear of arrest.
Although the sample size for this study (27) was too 
small to reliably quantify how often refugees are 
stopped by the authorities, the findings do indicate who 
tends to be stopped, and the various potential outcomes 
of such encounters. Middle-aged men interviewed for 
the study, particularly those who worked on or travelled 
on foot, motorbike or public transport, reported being 
frequently stopped and arrested by the police, between 
one and three times a month. This may be due to a 
number of factors. Men comprise the majority of the 
Rohingya refugee population in Malaysia, and may be 
more likely to violate laws in pursuit of their livelihoods 
(such as driving a motorcycle to work without a 
licence). Refugee men are also often more visible to the 
police than women, who are more likely to stay at or 
near home. 
Groups typically considered more ‘vulnerable’ – 
women, children and the elderly – seemed to be 
stopped and arrested much less frequently, suggesting 
a degree of sympathy from the authorities. One 
woman, who had been in Malaysia for 17 years, 
worked outside every day as a street sweeper yet 
had never been stopped. She thought this might be 
because she was mistaken for a Malaysian Indian 
because of her dark skin tone, and ‘also because 
authorities suspect men only, never stop the women. 
My husband has a problem being stopped by the 
police’. Age also seemed to be a protective factor, 
with visibly older refugees less likely to be stopped. 
One elderly refugee noted how he and his wife had 
not been stopped by the police, and while their 
teenage son had been, ‘police have taken pity on him 
and not arrested him’. 
Nearly all of the refugees who spoke about being 
stopped by the police also discussed having to pay 
bribes to authorities – in effect an informal tax 
on their livelihoods – in order to avoid arrest.18 
Refugees reported paying different amounts, ranging 
4 Networks and institutions:  
 Malaysian authorities    
18 Although refugees’ undocumented and ‘illegal’ status renders 
them particularly vulnerable to having to pay illegal bribes to 
authorities, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which 
corruption and bribery affect Malaysian nationals as well: 
according to Transparency International, Malaysia ranks 50 
out of 175 countries on the 2014 corruption perceptions index 
(1 being the most corrupt); 9% of Malaysians reported paying 
a bribe in 2010; and 76% of respondents in Malaysia in 2013 
felt the police were corrupt or extremely corrupt (Transparency 
International, 2015).
17 The term ‘authorities’ is used here to denote the multiple 
categories of Malaysian authorities with whom refugees may 
interact regarding their immigration status. These include 
police, immigration officials and RELA (Pasukan Sukarelawan 
Malaysia/The People’s Volunteer Corps, a volunteer civilian 
force operating in Malaysia).
16   Livelihood strategies of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia: ‘We want to live in dignity’
from Ringgit (RM) 20–50 ($4.50–11.30), and were 
stopped an average of 2–3 times a month, amounting 
to around 10% of their salary. Refugees’ salaries 
are already low when compared to the rest of the 
population in Kuala Lumpur: in 2013 the monthly 
median salary of Malaysians in Kuala Lumpur was 
RM 2,095 ($475) (Khazanah Research Institute, 
2015); most refugees interviewed earned less than half 
that. The need to set aside funds for bribes therefore 
places a significant strain on their finances. Of the 
refugees interviewed for this study, nearly a quarter 
had experienced arrest and detention; the majority had 
also been deported to Thailand before making their 
way back to Malaysia. 
4.2 Responding to the authorities
Speaking the national language, Bahasa Malaysia, 
was critical to two interlinked tactics refugees 
employed if they were stopped by the authorities: 
negotiating and invoking sympathy. As one refugee 
explained: ‘It is harder for newcomers, they don’t 
speak Malay. Dealing with authorities depends a 
lot on the explanation. If a refugee cannot speak 
Malay the police will charge him. If he speaks Malay 
and can explain politely that he is a refugee, people 
will take pity’. Another refugee described being 
stopped by the police and released without having 
to pay a bribe because he showed his UN card. 
The authorities held him for a long period but he 
refused to give them money; instead, he explained his 
situation and they let him go. He said ‘when police 
ask where we are from and we say we are Rohingya 
Muslim, then the police understand and take pity’. 
Being able to communicate refugee status and reason 
with the authorities was cited by many refugees as 
helping them avoid arrest or having to pay a bribe.
Some refugees sought to appeal to the authorities’ 
sympathies in other ways. One refugee interviewed 
collects and resells recyclable goods (such as scrap 
metal, bottles and cans) on his motorbike. He 
described how he intentionally brings his small 
children on the back of his motorbike, so that if he is 
stopped by the authorities they would let him go after 
he pleaded with them by saying his children would 
starve if he had to pay a bribe or was detained. This is 
one example of many that emerged during the research 
in which Rohingya refugees deliberately created an 
image of vulnerability in order to manage interactions 
with the authorities. 
The primary religion practiced in Malaysia is Islam, 
and some refugees relied on their religious affiliation 
to manage their relations with the authorities. One 
Rohingya Imam interviewed said: ‘In Malaysia if I 
have the cap, beard and dress the police respect me, 
they don’t arrest me because I am a religious man’. 
While he is not detained, he nevertheless has issues 
with the authorities, having been stopped two days 
prior to the interview while in a car. He said: 
When they saw my UN card they ripped the 
top layer of plastic off then gave the card back. 
I think because I am a religious man they are 
shy to ask money from me. I have a document 
saying I am an Imam, and when I showed it to 
the police officer, the officer apologized.
While his religious status did not spare him from 
harassment, it did ultimately lend a layer of informal 
protection. One widow we spoke to also successfully 
managed encounters with the authorities by appealing 
to religion – as well as sympathy. When she was 
stopped by the police, she showed them a letter of 
recommendation issued by a religious institution, 
stating that she was the widow of an Imam; she said: 
‘The officer told me he had the right to arrest me but 
didn’t want to, because he could see from the letter I 
was a widow with two young children.’
For some women refugees, their method for dealing 
with the authorities was to avoid them altogether. 
After having been arrested five times, and forced to 
pay bribes, one unregistered refugee woman chose not 
to venture out of the house, even to the health clinic. 
Her husband works outside, and continues to pay 
bribes when stopped by the authorities.
4.3 Refugees’ perspectives on  
the authorities
Interviews conducted for this study highlighted the 
complexity of refugees’ perceptions regarding the 
authorities. While many refugees discussed their 
fear of authority and a few mentioned being treated 
disrespectfully, numerous refugees accepted that the 
authorities were just doing their job. One man linked 
rights to responsibilities that refugees, by virtue of 
their status, were unable to fulfil. Although Abdul 
(Box 4) had been arrested, detained and imprisoned 
during his time in Malaysia, he reflected on how 
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treatment by the authorities related to the larger 
picture of how refugees contribute to society: ‘it is 
difficult to survive in Malaysia, but we cannot blame 
the Malaysian government, they are just following 
the law. Those with permits and passports pay taxes, 
whereas refugees are here illegally and do not pay 
tax to the government’. His statement highlights 
a disturbing extension of state and institutional 
determination that refugees are ‘illegal’, such that 
some Rohingya refugees have internalised that idea 
themselves, and consider themselves to have less rights 
or status in society as a result.  
19 The name Nasaka is formed from the initials of the Burmese-
language name, Nat-Sat Kut-Kwey Ye, translated as Burmese 
Border Security Force. It was a border security force operating 
mainly in northern Rakhine state, along the Bangladesh border. 
It served as the most prominent state authority in Rakhine 
and carried out widespread human rights violations against 
the Rohingya, according to human rights groups (HRW, 2012, 
2013; Fortify Rights 2015). It was disbanded in 2013. 
Abdul was just 14 years old when he fled from 
Myanmar after being tortured by the Nasaka.19 
Now in his early twenties, he has lived in Malaysia 
for over four years. His six-year journey took him 
from Bangladesh to Thailand and briefly to Malaysia 
before being arrested and imprisoned after less 
than a month in the country. He was deported to 
Thailand, where he was kidnapped by traffickers 
and forced into slavery on a fishing boat. He finally 
escaped after four years, and was able to contact 
his grandfather, who was living in Thailand at the 
time. After a month he left to join his uncle in Kuala 
Lumpur, who convinced his employer to give Abdul 
a job. Abdul began to collect used items to sell, 
and was able to save up enough money to buy a 
motorcycle, enabling him to collect and sell a larger 
volume of goods. 
Abdul’s story is one of (relative) success. His goals 
when coming to Malaysia were to find work, save 
money in order to get married, have a family and be 
able to support them – all of which he has done. But 
he still struggles with day-to-day hardships. He has 
had many run-ins with the authorities, been arrested 
numerous times and has to pay bribes to the police 
regularly, despite having a UNHCR card that proves 
his recognised refugee status. Harassment is 
particularly frequent when he is on his motorcycle; 
refugees cannot legally be issued driving licences 
in Malaysia, so Abdul is breaking the law. Some 
police officers accept bribes, while others arrest him. 
Abdul prefers to pay bribes as it resolves the issue 
immediately; he assumes that, if he is arrested, he 
will ultimately have to pay a fine as well. On the 
occasions he has been arrested, his Malaysian boss 
– with whom he has a good relationship – has come 
to the police station to secure his release. 
Abdul understands why the police behave as they 
do: he compares the authorities in Malaysia to those 
in Myanmar, observing that ‘at least in Malaysia 
the policemen are polite, in Myanmar they would 
kick and abuse the Rohingya people’. Abdul is also 
sympathetic to the position that the local authorities 
find themselves in. He says he wants to obey the 
law, but has been forced to do illegal things to 
survive, and the job of the police is to uphold the law. 
He is also keenly aware that he is not a citizen of 
Malaysia – and is accepting of the limitations that this 
entails: ‘this is not our country and we are breaking 
the law – so I understand the police’s position … how 
can we dislike them, it is not our country’.
Box 4: Abdul’s story 
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If someone has just arrived in Malaysia, they 
have to survive here. I would help them get a 
job and advise them not to break any laws or to 
make problems with people. I have helped some 
people here. They are in trouble. I am the same. 
So I feel sympathy for them.
Findings from this study illustrate a wide range 
of examples of refugee–refugee and host–refugee 
assistance. Malaysians and fellow Rohingya helped 
refugees overcome bureaucratic restrictions, facilitating 
their access to institutions, and providing direct 
assistance. This was done on both an ad hoc and 
formal basis, with refugees assisting people in their 
networks as well as donating to religious institutions 
that redistribute donations to the most needy.
5.1 Rohingya social networks 
Every Rohingya refugee interviewed described receiving 
help from other Rohingya: relatives, friends, villagers, 
co-workers, community workers, neighbours and 
even strangers. Social networks provide social capital, 
protection, livelihood support and shelter, ranging 
from sharing accommodation, lending or giving money, 
finding job opportunities and providing advice. They 
also provide a sense of belonging in an alien country: 
‘Networks that braid together ethnic, kin, and religious 
ties are mobilised to help deal with the alienation 
of prolonged exile’ (Zaman, 2012: 137). Numerous 
refugees attributed their decision of where to live (or 
move) in Malaysia to the desire to be close to strong 
friendship or family networks. Refugees also tended to 
live amongst their social networks, with several family 
units sharing one home and splitting living costs.
Rohingya refugees largely relied on pre-existing social 
networks developed while they were still in Myanmar 
to guide their journey to and within Malaysia. 
Advice from friends and family already in Malaysia – 
communicated via phone and word of mouth –  helps 
shape decisions about whether or not to come to 
Malaysia, how best to make the journey and where 
in the country to settle. Many refugees attributed 
their decision to come to Malaysia (as opposed to 
Thailand or other neighbouring countries) to religion, 
but also the existence of other Rohingya people in the 
country. Refugees’ initial decision to come to Malaysia 
is important when considering the trajectory of their 
displacement life histories and livelihoods, as much like 
all decisions over the course of protracted displacement, 
it is based on what refugees perceive to be the options 
available to them. The presence of family or friends in 
Malaysia makes viable the idea of them going, and also 
affects their experience upon arrival.
Once in Malaysia, interviewees noted the importance of 
people from the same village or town back in Myanmar; 
as one refugee said when asked about networks:
It is a necessity for human beings because we 
need the links. If you don’t have relatives or 
siblings here you should at least have a link with 
villagers. If the new ones coming from Rakhine 
do not have a link in Malaysia how can they be 
released [from people smugglers]? They will be in 
trouble. Networks are a necessity.
Pre-established social networks were critical to 
Rohingya refugees when they reached Malaysia, with 
most refugees citing how their friends, family and 
villagers helped them get established upon arrival. 
This included providing a place to stay, putting them 
in contact with employers or others within their 
network to help them secure jobs and providing small 
amounts of money to help them survive while looking 
for work. The extent to which refugees helped other 
refugees secure employment (discussed in Chapter 6) 
illustrates the importance of social networks in forging 
5 Networks and institutions:  
 Rohingya refugees and host  
 communities  
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the initial connection between refugees and employers, 
and indicates that such connections may go some way 
towards helping refugees circumvent barriers (such as 
language and documentation) that may otherwise limit 
employment opportunities.
Refugees who arrived in Malaysia without contacts 
(or who had lost contact with those they knew in 
Malaysia) had two options: to forge their own path, 
or rely on the kindness of strangers (most often also 
Rohingya). One refugee, Halek, arrived in Malaysia 
21 years ago, without any pre-existing social 
networks. He did not have anyone to turn to for help 
in order to find work, so he decided to approach 
construction sites directly to ask for a job. Although 
Halek spoke little Malay, he was offered a job at the 
second construction site he visited, highlighting that, 
while social connections were important in facilitating 
livelihoods, when left without options people find a 
way to make the best of their situation. He worked 
there for four years, learning Malay in the process, 
and was eventually able to save money to pay for his 
family to join him in Malaysia. Now nearing 60, he 
notes that his children and their partners help support 
him. Although he arrived with no social networks, 
and did not receive help from others, he has brought 
over and expanded his own network and now makes 
donations to help new arrivals. Help from strangers 
was more common when those receiving help were 
described as vulnerable in some way: widows with 
young children, the homeless or injured. Refugees 
often spoke of ‘taking pity’ on the other refugees 
they helped. Undergoing similar challenges in 
Myanmar and during the journey to Malaysia seemed 
to reinforce a sense of shared responsibility and 
humanity. As one refugee said, ‘We have humanity – 
we have to help each other’. 
Over time, refugees can build up and expand their 
networks, often to the benefit of other refugees as well 
as themselves. Refugees interviewed for this study did 
not describe expanding their networks as an explicit 
goal, but rather as occurring naturally over the course 
of their time in Malaysia. Like individuals anywhere, 
the social networks of Rohingya refugees tend to 
develop through daily interactions, including through 
work, neighbours, community-based organisations and 
religious organisations. One refugee, Khaleque, described 
expanding the size and influence of his networks as 
he met more people in Malaysia, and more people he 
knew came to Malaysia. Four years ago, the brother 
of Khaleque’s friend (a fellow villager, with Indonesian 
citizenship) bought a tea shop, and asked Khaleque 
to run it for him. His shop is a well-known spot for 
Rohingya people seeking help: many customers have run 
up lengthy tabs, and 10–20 people regularly stay in the 
small rooms in the back of the shop, ostensibly paying 
rent though most are unable to. In effect, Khaleque is 
now providing the type of support to new arrivals that 
he was unable to obtain when he first arrived. 
The growing number of friends, family members and 
villagers arriving in Malaysia has also contributed 
to the expansion of social networks for Rohingya 
Religion plays an important part in the lives of 
many Rohingya refugees, not least because they 
have been persecuted in part due to their religious 
identity. Many Rohingya refugees interviewed for 
the study explicitly mentioned religion as playing 
a role in their decision to come to Malaysia (rather 
than going to other neighbouring countries), and 
perceive Allah or religious practice as contributing 
to their continued survival.
Mosques acted as important communal meeting 
spaces for Rohingya refugees, many of whom go 
for regular prayer. Malaysian mosques served as 
shared spaces for refugee and host populations, 
but some Rohingya people have also set up their 
own spaces for prayer in the form of suraus, or 
smaller places for prayer. Some children attended 
madrassas – religious schools – because their 
parents explicitly wanted them to gain a religious 
education, or because it is one of the only 
alternatives given that refugee children cannot 
attend government schools.
These religious spaces also emerged as places 
of sanctuary, particularly for newly arrived 
refugees without pre-established networks 
looking for help or a place to stay. They received 
help from imams and visitors to the mosques, as 
well as from Rohingya, Malaysian or international 
individuals or organisations channelling donations 
through the mosque or surau. Help received 
from strangers at mosques was often short term, 
such as during Ramadan, helping refugees 
survive until they found other means of sustaining 
themselves.
Box 5: The role of Islam, mosques and imams
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refugees, whose migration patterns mirror the theory 
of ‘cumulative causation’, with existing refugees acting 
as a pull to those still in the country of origin, creating 
a multiplier effect (Massey, 1990). Men often make the 
journey on their own, with the expectation of sending 
funds home or saving enough money to pay for their 
wives and children to come to Malaysia once the men 
have established themselves. Other refugees then follow 
to the same location; as Abdul from Chapter 4 explained, 
he wanted to move from Thailand to Malaysia because 
‘I have no family and there are no Rohingya there so I 
wasn’t happy, I wanted to come to Malaysia’.
5.2 Rohingya community-based 
organisations
Beyond informal help through social networks, 
Rohingya refugees have supported each other through 
refugee-run community based organisations (CBOs). 
They are not registered with the authorities and 
operate under the radar, financed by membership fees, 
private donations from Malaysians and some project-
based UNHCR funding. Rohingya CBOs provide 
a range of services to refugee members, including 
those related to documentation (e.g. a membership 
document, which can be critical for unregistered asylum- 
seekers with no passport or identity documents, and 
marriage certificates); liaising with local institutions 
(e.g. negotiating with hospital staff to facilitate 
admission and treatment; facilitating the release of 
cadavers from the morgue); education (operating 
community-based learning centres for refugee children); 
assistance (providing in-kind donations to refugees 
in need); operating a convalescent shelter for ill or 
vulnerable refugees; and livelihood support (connecting 
unemployed refugees with employers).
Estimates suggest there are over 15 Rohingya CBOs 
in Malaysia, though only a few are consistently 
active and only one has a direct relationship with 
Eighteen-year-old Yussuf has been in Malaysia for 
just ten months, a relative newcomer. The eldest 
son of a paralysed father, his parents decided to 
send him to Malaysia both to escape persecution 
and forced labour and to find work to support his 
family. He came specifically to Malaysia as he had 
Rohingya friends who had sought asylum there, 
and he hoped they would be able to help him find 
employment. During his journey to Malaysia, he and 
other passengers on the boat were kidnapped by 
smugglers and brought to a camp in the Thai jungle. 
He was held there and beaten by the smugglers for 
eight days, until his parents paid a ransom for his 
release. 
Back in Malaysia, Yussuf’s friends found him a 
job in construction. He lived and worked on the 
construction site, but it was frequently raided by 
the authorities. He escaped three raids, but during 
the fourth he fell trying to evade the authorities, 
seriously injuring his back. His friends and 
co-workers took him to UNHCR, where a UN officer 
gave him a slip of paper to take to the hospital. 
A Rohingya man who was also at the UN office 
helped him to the hospital, but they were sent away 
because Yussuf did not have a UN card. 
Yussuf approached the UN office again the next day, 
and the UN sent him to a government hospital with 
a UN interpreter. The hospital again refused to admit 
him and, as he was unable to access medical care 
at a public hospital, the interpreter took him to a 
shelter run by a Rohingya community organisation. 
The organisation collected money from other 
members to pay for his hospital fees and wrote a 
letter for him, which enabled him to be admitted to 
hospital despite not having a UNHCR card. After five 
days in hospital he began to recover and returned to 
the shelter. He has now been there for three and a 
half months. His back has still not completely healed 
and, unable to do heavy labour, Yussuf helps out at 
the shelter. When asked how he plans to find a job, 
he says that the leader of the Rohingya organisation 
has offered to help him to secure work.
The Rohingya organisation continues to send 
letters to UNHCR on Yussuf’s behalf to make the 
case for him to be registered. Without a UN card 
he feels very vulnerable, and in constant fear of 
arrest. Having a UN card ‘would be freedom for me’, 
he says. It would also mean better job prospects, 
enabling him to reach his goal of supporting his 
family back in Myanmar.
Box 6: Yussuf’s story
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UNHCR. Refugees described collaboration between 
these organisations as limited, with the exception 
of joint advocacy on issues such as the rights of 
Rohingya people in Myanmar. Several interviewees 
lamented the lack of community coordination and 
collective bargaining power. This fragmentation can 
weaken Rohingya organisations’ ability to advocate 
on issues important to Rohingya refugees vis-à-vis 
institutions such as UNHCR. This is particularly stark 
in comparison to some other refugee communities in 
Malaysia (such as the Chin) that are regarded as well 
organised and able to provide support to others in 
the community. The majority of Rohingya refugees 
interviewed had either not received help, or had little 
knowledge of these organisations.
5.3 Questioning the idea of 
‘community’
The displacement life histories of the Rohingya refugees 
we interviewed are in line with existing research, which 
suggests that, for refugees in circumstances with harsh 
immigration policies and where formal assistance 
is scarce, social ties are the primary determinant of 
survival and success (Palmgren, 2014; Krause-Vilmar 
and Chaffin, 2011). Yet, while internal assistance 
in refugee communities is often perceived as a sign 
of social cohesion, collective agency and communal 
solidarity, some have interpreted it more as ‘an 
inevitable response to communal crisis, rather than 
evidence of the vibrancy of solidarity, as people are 
compelled to help each other even with limited access to 
material assets’ (Omata, 2013: 275).
Such arguments have salience when discussing refugees 
in Malaysia, many of whom struggle to provide for 
themselves, let alone extend support to others, and 
whose interactions reflect complex issues of power, 
trust, hierarchy and gender. According to Shaw (2009), 
refugee policymakers must identify the compromises, 
sacrifices and pressure that refugees face when seeking 
to support others; otherwise, they may idealise the 
idea of community support, and rely too heavily 
on communities to fill the gap left by insufficient 
institutional assistance. This is particularly pertinent in 
today’s policy environment, where growing recognition 
of communities as first responders and main sources 
of support during crises risks overlooking the sacrifices 
that this requires. As one refugee stated, ‘how can we 
help when we live hand to mouth ourselves?’. 
Interviews also highlighted an underlying sense of 
mistrust and fear amongst refugees when interacting 
with some fellow Rohingya. Refugees interviewed 
expressed particular concern regarding exploitation and 
people smuggling, as some of the smugglers identified 
in refugees’ stories were also Rohingya. Some may be 
lower-level agents whose principal role is to link people 
up to the smuggling boats, but others are more heavily 
involved in the more violent and exploitative parts of 
the operation, such as visiting the families of refugees 
to demand or extort payment or torturing people in the 
trafficking camps in the Thai jungle. 
One young man, Hassan, recounted a particularly 
harrowing experience of exploitation and harassment 
by another Rohingya refugee. Hassan became very 
ill during his journey to Malaysia and the man took 
advantage of the situation, demanding payment from 
Hassan’s family and claiming he was a relative paying 
for his medical treatment. He has since called Hassan 
repeatedly for money and has made threats against his 
life. Hassan, who lives in a shelter run by a Rohingya 
CBO, believes he has been targeted because he does 
not have family or strong networks in Malaysia. 
Hassan’s family in Myanmar also face harassment 
from people smugglers asking for money to pay for 
Hassan’s journey, despite them having already paid 
the fee. Hassan has been severely traumatised by this 
experience and finds it difficult to trust anyone – 
Rohingya or otherwise. ‘I don’t believe other Rohingya 
people. I don’t believe in myself’, he said. He 
deliberately limits his social networks, largely seeking 
to avoid contact with others, either within or beyond 
the Rohingya community, but does note that he trusts 
those working for the CBO that has helped him.
Hassan’s story reflects tensions among Rohingya 
refugees between wanting and needing to trust those 
within their community, while at the same time 
avoiding exploitative elements; and between wanting 
to help newcomers while still protecting themselves. 
A representative of a refugee-run NGO initially stated 
that ‘priority [for assistance] goes to unregistered and 
newcomers’, but later in the interview acknowledged 
that the NGO intentionally avoids contact with 
newcomers for fear of being perceived of having ties 
to the people smugglers who often linger around 
new arrivals while they settle their debts. Refugees in 
Malaysia were very aware of the tenuous space they 
occupy in terms of their legal status, and identified 
their engagement with new arrivals as potentially 
exposing them to greater risk.
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5.4 The host community
Host communities have a significant influence on 
refugees’ experiences in any country of asylum. With 
158,510 registered refugees and asylum-seekers (as of 
February 2016) and thousands more unregistered and 
scattered across various cities and towns in Malaysia, 
many local Malaysians regularly interact with 
refugees. In Kuala Lumpur, Rohingya refugees live in 
pockets across the city: neighbourhoods are mixed, 
comprising local Malaysians, immigrants, Rohingya 
refugees and refugees from various parts of the world.
Refugees interviewed for this study largely expressed 
positive opinions of Malaysians, with many 
acknowledging that they had received some form of 
support. Malaysians assisted refugees by supporting 
their livelihoods (e.g. employing refugees or helping 
them secure jobs; providing investment capital 
for refugees’ businesses); overcoming bureaucratic 
restrictions (e.g. purchasing goods for refugees that 
they are prohibited from buying themselves, such as 
motorcycles); facilitating their access to institutions 
(e.g. UNHCR); and providing direct assistance (e.g. 
donations of cash and goods). One refugee said, 
‘Malaysian people are good to refugees, they don’t 
make any problems because they try to understand 
our lives’. Many refugees appreciated that Malaysians 
sympathise or empathise with their plight, and noted 
instances where their rent had been reduced when 
sympathetic landlords ‘took pity on them’. 
While refugees acknowledged having received monetary 
and in-kind charitable donations from Malaysians, 
what they most valued were acts of kindness. Support 
was provided by neighbours, landlords, employers 
or others directly connected to the refugees. When 
asked to whom she would turn if she needed help, one 
refugee woman named her brother’s Malaysian friends. 
Although most Rohingya refugees first turned to fellow 
Rohingyas, there was a feeling that they too were living 
hand to mouth, while Malaysians were better off and 
perhaps had greater capacity to help. Only one refugee, 
a widow with young children, mentioned receiving 
aid from a Malaysian NGO, though neither she nor 
her neighbours were particularly clear on the source 
of aid or why she had received it. Another recalled a 
Malaysian imam advising him where he could receive 
donations during Ramadan.
Having been driven to flee their own country due to 
their ethnicity and religion, being accepted by locals in 
a country that is not their own is not just important 
in practice, but also in conveying a sense of peace and 
stability. Still, as with the Rohingya community – or 
indeed any community – refugees’ engagement with 
the host community has its challenges. One refugee 
reported how Malaysian gangsters target refugees 
and extort money from them, because they see them 
as vulnerable and therefore easy targets. A Rohingya 
refugee woman who worked as a street-sweeper 
described how local Malaysians would close their 
doors when they saw her approaching, and would 
refuse to give her any water. 
Some refugees had strong social ties with local 
Malaysians – as one refugee described, his employer 
and employer’s wife ‘love him, like a son’. For a few, 
Malaysians featured much more prominently in their 
social networks than fellow Rohingya. This could be 
attributed in part to the mistrust and lack of solidarity 
amongst Rohingya refugees described above. Noor, 
a Rohingya refugee, described how she avoided 
interaction with fellow Rohingya, stating, ‘I never made 
friends with other Rohingya people, I stay far from 
them. I feel different than them and their morality … I 
pray five times a day, I like Malaysian culture, I feel it 
is good and religious’. While Noor’s perception of and 
relationship with other Rohingya refugees in Malaysia 
has admittedly been coloured by the fact that she has a 
distant relative who appears to have ties with smuggling 
rings, it also reflects two broader issues highlighted 
in this report: the complexity of intra-community 
dynamics (namely deep-rooted issues of mistrust), 
and the variable nature of Rohingya ‘communities’ in 
Malaysia and refugees’ engagement in them (as opposed 
to the notion of one cohesive Rohingya ‘community’). 
Smith (2013: 22) explored the impact of refugees’ ties 
to the culture of their country of origin on the kinds of 
networks they could develop in the host country. The 
research found ‘cases that assigned a high degree of 
importance to their native cultural heritage developed 
stronger, supportive ties to family and religious 
networks while those that assigned less importance 
to cultural heritage had stronger ties to co-workers 
and neighbours’. While keeping their ties to Rohingya 
culture and community intentionally loose, Noor and 
her family were able to replace those connections with 
stronger ties to Malaysian people and culture. This 
is evidenced in her ability to expand her networks 
to include a wide range of Malaysians, such as her 
landlord, neighbours, a teacher who subsequently 
became her employer and former co-workers. In 
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effect, Noor’s disillusionment with Rohingya people 
has allowed her to better assimilate into the host 
community. These are the trade-offs for refugees and 
migrants: balancing the support and shared sense of 
identity from those within their community, versus the 
benefits that can come from greater integration.   
This has had clear benefits for Noor and her children. 
They have been able to obtain safer and better-paid 
jobs, and integrate with local society – which has 
had the added benefit of allowing them to avoid 
trouble with/detection by the authorities. Noor runs 
a home day-care programme for local Malaysian 
children (she was encouraged to open the day-care 
centre by a former Malaysian co-worker). She loves 
her job, a rarity for Rohingya refugees. She has 
never experienced problems or felt tension from the 
Malaysian parents, though she recognises that this 
is unusual: ‘there is no one like me in Malaysia, a 
refugee who can look after Malaysian children’. 
She believes that this is due in part to her piety, and 
that the Malaysian parents are familiar with her as 
she has lived in the neighbourhood for a long time. 
While many Rohingya tend to cluster together, she 
has often chosen explicitly to live in a Malaysian 
neighbourhood, with Malaysian people. Her daughter 
has also integrated well, and is rarely stopped by the 
police. Even so, there are limits to such integration 
in Malaysia, as both lack the security and equality 
that come with legal status: Noor earns less than 
Malaysian counterparts doing similar work, and her 
daughter’s undocumented status prevents her from 
pursuing her goal of further education. 
Noor’s family is an exception rather than the norm. 
While many refugees expressed appreciation for 
being allowed to stay in Malaysia, the majority were 
extremely conscious of how that stay (even if it 
stretched over decades) would ultimately be temporary 
as long as Malaysia’s policies towards refugees remain 
unchanged (see Chapter 7 for further discussion on 
durable solutions). Refugees expressed how, even after 
many years, they still did not feel at home in Malaysia. 
As one Rohingya refugee put it, ‘We are Rohingya, we 
are also Muslims. We know this is a Muslim country 
and we thought they would treat us equally, but they 
do not. We do not have equal rights’. Thus, while 
refugee and host networks can be mutually beneficial 
and important, they are not enough to help refugees 
overcome the effects of restrictive refugee policies set 
by host governments, and the associated structural, 
institutional and cultural barriers.
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6  Economic activity
I am considering how to survive with dignity 
in Malaysia. Here I have a UNHCR card, 
but this still does not allow me to work in 
Malaysia legally. Business owners will only 
employ refugees for the length of the validity 
of the card, so refugees can never plan for the 
future, employment is subject to the situation. 
We are only refugees here.
6.1 Types of employment
Of the 27 refugees interviewed, eight were 
unemployed and 19 were self-employed (nine), 
conducting work for which they were remunerated 
by the Rohingya community (three), or employed on 
a formal contract (seven). Half of the unemployed 
refugees were entirely supported by a relative; the 
other half worked informally and were therefore 
only partially dependent on support from their 
family or community members (see Table 1). While 
the refugees interviewed undertook a range of 
initial jobs, the work tended to be physically hard 
and insecure (i.e. ad hoc or short term). Most had 
worked in 2–6 different jobs/sectors over the course 
of their time in Malaysia. 
6.2 Securing employment: 
networks and other strategies
Nearly all of the refugees interviewed for this 
study relied on networks to find work. For most, 
this involved word of mouth within the Rohingya 
community – including immediate family, distant 
relatives, friends, villagers, community leaders and, to 
a lesser extent, strangers – to convey that they were 
looking for work, identify opportunities and make 
connections with Malaysian employers. 
Beyond securing employment, some Rohingya refugees 
also relied on other Rohingya people to help them 
save the earnings they generated. As few refugees are 
able to (or know how to) access the information and 
support required to open a bank account, some save 
their money with one of two competing Rohingya 
businessmen who provide banking services for 
Rohingya refugees in Kuala Lumpur, without interest. 
This was instrumental in helping refugees interviewed 
for this study save to invest in their livelihoods or 
bring family members over to Malaysia.
Commonly, refugees secured jobs for other refugees 
at their place of employment (factories, restaurants, 
construction sites). In some instances there was a 
Unemployed (entirely 
dependent on family 
for support)
• Supported by husband 
• Supported by nephew
• Supported by adult  
  sons 
• Supported by wife
Conducts informal 
income-generating 
activities and receives 
support from family, 
community members 
or strangers
• Betel nut shop helper  
 at shelter
• Cuts betel nut, tutors  
 Rohingya children
• Makes food to sell,  
 receives donations
• Begging
Self-employed
• Recycling collector (x4) 
• Fish seller 
• Runs shop (with  
 initial support from  
 a microfinance  
 programme)
• Home day care worker
• Tea shop manager (x2) 
Works for the refugee 
community
• Imam
• Rohingya NGO worker
• Rohingya school &  
 community worker
Works on a contract 
basis
 
• Road sweeper (x3)
• Office cleaner
• Construction worker
• Assistant at Malaysian  
 school
• Electrical line worker
 
Table 1: Income-generating activities undertaken by refugees at the time they were interviewed 
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reciprocal arrangement between refugees and their 
employers: refugees would inform their employers 
if they knew of refugees seeking work, and the 
employers would inform their employees if they were 
looking to hire more refugees. Tea shops (restaurants 
serving food and beverages) were a key location 
for finding work. Refugees networked with people 
they knew (for example to discuss employment 
opportunities with friends and villagers), or met 
people who could help them find employment. 
This was generally done by refugees who had no 
friends or family in Malaysia, and who were trying 
to forge initial connections; one refugee described 
his arrival in Malaysia, saying ‘I went to Penang, 
and when I got off the bus I went to a tea shop and 
met a Rohingya man, a refugee with a UN card. I 
explained my story to the man, and that I had no 
place to stay, and the man told me to follow him 
and got me a job’. Another refugee described how a 
Rohingya tea shop had been informally established 
for Malaysians looking to hire day labourers. While 
hiring refugees is technically illegal, refugees suggested 
that some Malaysians preferred hiring refugees 
rather than Malaysians for reasons both charitable 
(e.g. employers were sympathetic to the situation of 
Rohingya refugees) and exploitative (e.g. employers 
could pay refugees lower wages, and refugees would 
work longer hours and do jobs Malaysians did not 
want to do). 
Beyond using their networks, some refugees 
approached businesses such as restaurants and 
construction sites directly to ask for a job. Refugees 
we interviewed also discussed using brokers, though 
none had done so themselves. These brokers (who 
have slightly different operating procedures) generally 
take a commission from the employer and/or the 
refugee, and in the case of the latter deducts the fee 
from the refugee’s salary if they are unable to pay up 
front. Participants noted that, while refugees who have 
been in Malaysia for some time are more likely to find 
employment on their own or through networks, new 
arrivals are more likely to rely on brokers.
The biggest barrier refugees identified to working 
in Malaysia was not having an identity document 
(i.e. a UNHCR card or passport). Even so, refugees 
recognised that, while having a UNHCR card might 
help them secure employment, it was an inadequate 
form of documentation for legal employment; one 
refugee noted that ‘sometimes Rohingya people 
are arrested at their workplace, even if they have a 
Mohamed, a UNHCR-recognised refugee in his 
mid-30s, has been in Malaysia for eight years. 
He acknowledges the essential role of networks, 
relatives and villagers in supporting refugees 
who have recently arrived from Myanmar: he was 
very well supported by his siblings, who provided 
him with accommodation and arranged for him 
to work as a grass-cutter. Mohamed had been 
a businessman in Myanmar, and within a few 
months of arriving in Malaysia he began helping 
his brother with his business selling goods from 
a car. Over the next three years he saved over 
RM30,000 (around $6,800), enabling him to 
send money home and bring his future wife from 
Myanmar to Malaysia.  
After some time, Mohamed stopped selling goods 
from his car as competition grew and demands 
for bribes from the police increased. He returned 
to grass-cutting, but this time as a sub-contractor 
as opposed to a labourer, and rather than 
saving his profits he started up and invested in 
small refugee-run businesses. After six years 
in Malaysia, Mohamed was hit by a motorcycle: 
his leg was badly broken and he underwent an 
operation, at a cost of RM5,000 ($1,130). He 
quickly depleted his savings, could no longer 
manage his grass cutting contracts and had to 
withdraw his investments because he needed 
the money to cover living expenses. On the 
advice of friends, and with a start-up investment 
of RM13,000 ($2,940) from a Rohingya refugee, 
Mohamed opened a tea shop. At the time of 
the interview the tea shop had been open for 
four months and was financially successful, 
generating enough profit for Mohamed to repay a 
fifth of the loan. 
Measured against his own goals (to get married, 
send money back to Myanmar and run successful 
businesses), Mohamed has done well. He links 
his ability to recover from the aftershocks of his 
injury to the blessing of God and the help of good 
friends – attributing the latter’s willingness to help 
him to his piety and the extent of the help he had 
given others prior to the accident. Still, Mohamed 
maintains that ‘I have not succeeded yet, but I 
have had some success’.
Box 7: Mohamed’s story
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UNHCR card’ – yet thousands of refugees do work, 
despite the legal and practical barriers. The experience 
of one refugee, described in Box 7, provides insight 
into how refugees forge livelihoods in Malaysia over 
the course of protracted displacement. 
Mohamed’s story is, in many regards, one of success: 
he used skills and experience gained in Myanmar 
to gain an income in Malaysia, he achieved goals 
related to both his family and his livelihood and he 
recovered from a serious shock by starting his own 
business, as many refugees aspire to do. Even so, his 
situation is precarious: he has a significant debt to 
repay, and he is in an industry where competition 
can be high and businesses struggle. The fact that 
Mohamed has had ‘success’ numerous times, lost 
it and had to rebuild is illustrative of the fact that 
‘success’ is not something you achieve, it is something 
you have to maintain – which is particularly 
difficult given the insecurity in which refugees in 
Malaysia live. While people labelled as having an 
obvious vulnerability (e.g. people with disabilities, 
women at risk) are often targeted for assistance or 
programmatic interventions, the chronic vulnerability 
that cross-cuts urban refugee populations in contexts 
such as Malaysia is insufficiently recognised or 
integrated into aid interventions.
Mohamed is an example of a refugee who needed 
a limited amount of help to become self-sustaining, 
rather than requiring on-going assistance, and as 
such is precisely the type of person for whom many 
livelihood interventions (such as microfinance) are 
designed.20 The problem with basing livelihood 
interventions around people like Mohamed, however, 
is that his ‘success’ is not attainable by many refugees 
who lack the types of capital (linguistic, financial, 
social) that contributed to Mohamed’s ability to 
run a profitable business. For practitioners and 
policy-makers trying to support refugee livelihoods, 
Mohamed’s story highlights the need to critically 
consider the notion of ‘successful’ refugee livelihoods 
in situations of protracted urban displacement. 
Lessons can certainly be learned from understanding 
what factors support refugees in establishing 
and maintaining successful livelihoods (strong 
networks, capabilities and skills that correspond 
to the local market). However, it is also necessary 
to recognise the specific challenges different 
categories of refugees face (for example, newly 
arrived asylum-seekers, who often struggle because 
they are undocumented, do not speak the local 
language, have difficulty accessing social networks 
and support and cannot translate skills and 
knowledge attained in their country of origin into 
a viable livelihood in the urban context) and target 
appropriate protection and livelihood interventions 
accordingly. It also involves recognising the 
precariousness of apparent ‘success’ for refugees 
who are forced to continually mitigate challenges 
and seek livelihood opportunities in the urban 
context, as well as the individual and institutional 
factors that prohibit many refugees from aspiring to 
or achieving what are often considered ‘successful’ 
livelihoods.
Running a business – in Mohamed’s case, a tea shop 
– was identified by many refugees as a ‘better job’ to 
be aspired to. Mohamed – and another refugee we 
interviewed, Khaleque – each ran a tea shop, located 
a few streets apart. Their ability to do so stemmed 
from a combination of requisite business experience 
and social capital (being men, speaking the local 
language, having strong networks and connections 
among refugees and non-refugees, which enabled 
them to operate a business registered to a Malaysian). 
It also required investment from others in the form 
of financial and logistical support, investments 
likely made on the presumption that Mohamed and 
Khaleque’s previous success (such as Mohamed’s 
profitable employment prior to his accident) was 
indicative of their potential future success as small 
business operators. While the two men shared these 
key similarities, their different experiences provide 
interesting points of analysis. 
Khaleque (as described in Chapter 5) had been in 
Malaysia for 27 years, and had worked hard to 
reach a point where he could run his own business. 
Although he managed to secure work in numerous 
restaurants, he endured exploitation and was arrested 
and then deported for being undocumented. Four 
years prior to the interview, a Rohingya businessman 
with Indonesian citizenship bought a tea shop and 
asked Khaleque to run it; by this time, Khaleque 
had worked in restaurants for years, and the owner 
turned to him to run the tea shop because, in addition 
20 Despite this, it is pertinent to note that Mohamed required 
an initial investment of nearly $3,000 to start his business, 
which exponentially exceeds the amounts generally loaned 
in microfinance schemes. Microfinance or other small-scale 
support would not have provided Mohamed the resources he 
needed to start his business, and have it achieve success 
within the timeframe he did.
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to his suitability for the role, they are family friends 
from the same village in Myanmar.21 Despite holding 
a job that most refugees desired (himself included), 
Khaleque’s business was struggling and he was in 
debt: he attributed this to a lack of paying customers, 
as most of his customers were Rohingya people who 
were struggling to subsist and unable to pay full 
price for their food. Khaleque felt a responsibility to 
support those in need, and though he kept records of 
outstanding bills he did not deny customers food, even 
if they could not pay.   
Findings from interviews with refugees such as 
Mohamed and Khaleque (who do ‘better’ jobs such 
as operating a business) provide two key points of 
discussion. First, while many refugees would perceive 
Mohamed and Khaleque as having ‘good’ jobs, like 
them Khaleque struggles to secure a viable livelihood 
and balance multiple goals and priorities (such as 
earning sufficient income to maintain his business and 
support his family, while also supporting vulnerable 
refugees in his community). They also provide insight 
into how refugees doing ‘better’ jobs perceive the 
lower-status jobs performed by other refugees. Some 
refugees in Malaysia chose to collect scrap metal as 
opposed to doing construction or factory work; when 
Khaleque was asked why, he said it was because:
they are uneducated, they don’t know their 
dignity. They only choose work based on how 
they can make money day by day, not in the 
long term for their future. Some people work as 
sweepers, grass-cutters – if someone comes to 
them and says we will give you RM300 ($70) to 
do this they just see the money and do it, they do 
not think about their dignity or their future.
Such perceptions allow us to better understand what 
motivates refugees to pursue certain livelihoods, why 
they set certain goals and objectives and their attitudes 
towards refugees who pursue different livelihoods. 
Unsurprisingly, when asked why they did the jobs 
they did, refugees working as street sweepers or scrap 
metal collectors provided very different answers. 
Some said they chose those jobs in order to mitigate 
the risk of working for an exploitative employer, to 
have the freedom to choose their hours and to directly 
correlate the hours they worked with income earned 
(as opposed to a fixed salary). Other refugees did these 
jobs because they simply did not see an alternative. 
One mother of four who worked as a street sweeper 
said: ‘I have no other options. I do this job patiently 
because I have to think about my house rent and 
utilities. My husband’s income is only enough for 
food’. Another refugee said: ‘I do not think I can 
earn a lot of money here. If I could find a better job 
opportunity I would take it, but I don’t know about 
any other opportunities. I only speak a little Malay, 
and this affects the kind of job I can get. It would be 
better if I spoke Malay’. 
6.3 Translating skills and 
experience from refugees’ 
country of origin
Although Mohamed initially worked as a grass-
cutter in Malaysia, he had held jobs such as selling 
clothes, buying and reselling goods, and running a 
hardware shop when he was in Myanmar, and within 
a few months he was able to use his connections and 
business skills to switch from manual labour to selling 
goods in Malaysia. This was unusual, as refugees’ 
previous work experience from Myanmar did not 
strongly correlate with the type of work they did in 
Malaysia. Refugees’ initial jobs tended to be whatever 
someone in their network could secure for them: a 
refugee who ran a shop in Myanmar initially worked 
in construction in Malaysia, for example, while a 
young man who did construction in Myanmar worked 
as a street sweeper in Malaysia. While some refugees 
were able to utilise skills they acquired in Myanmar 
to secure work in Malaysia, particularly once they 
had been in the country for some time, others found 
the specialised skills that had contributed to their 
livelihoods in Myanmar were largely irrelevant in 
Malaysia. One elderly man, for example, had worked 
as a typesetter in Myanmar but could not find work in 
Malaysia because people use computers there. Ruhul, 
a disabled man who had worked as a watch and 
umbrella repairer in Myanmar, could not find work 
because people rarely repaired watches or umbrellas in 
Malaysia (they bought new ones). 
These examples illustrate the marked discordance 
between certain skills and job experiences that were 
relevant to the livelihoods of Rohingya people in the 
21 Amongst other things, this exemplifies the importance of the 
social basis of trust for refugees trying to access economic 
activities. For further discussion of the relational aspects of 
economic activity see Pain and Mallet (2014).  
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impoverished, rural towns from which they fled and 
the skills and experience relevant in Kuala Lumpur, 
the capital of a middle-income country. This affirms 
findings from a survey of over 1,000 households of 
refugees from Myanmar in Malaysia (Smith, 2012: 
44), which illustrated significant differences in the 
jobs refugees undertook in Myanmar versus those they 
did in Malaysia. Individual circumstances also made 
it difficult for some refugees to translate skills and 
knowledge into viable income-generating activities in 
Malaysia – the elderly and those with health issues 
found it particularly difficult.
Figure 1: Employment in Myanmar compared with Malaysia
Car washer
Cleaner
Construction worker
Factory worker
Farmer
Fisher person
Food seller/grocer
Mechanic
Professional
Religious worker
Restaurant worker
Shop worker
Stay-at-home parent
Student
Tailor
Teacher
Unemployed
Other
Occupation in Myanmar        Occupation in Malaysia21
19
16 73
45
640
19
40 22
21 31
1617
19
46
16 12
10
37
56 62
364
31
91
60
50 17
13 279
Source: Smith, 2012
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Our life is gone, we need to give a better 
future to our children. Almost 14 years living 
in Malaysia, I cannot give a better life to my 
children here.
Refugees interviewed for this study identified four 
main priorities and goals: financially supporting 
themselves and their families in Malaysia and 
Myanmar, acquiring UNHCR registration and 
ensuring a better future for their children – but 
the ultimate goal described by nearly all refugees 
interviewed for this study was to attain the rights and 
freedoms associated with a durable solution. 
UNHCR has a framework with three categories of 
durable solutions through which it aims to ensure 
a safe and sustainable outcome for refugees. One 
is voluntary repatriation (when refugees return to 
their country of origin), another is local integration 
(when refugees are integrated into communities in 
their country of asylum) and the third is resettlement 
(the transfer of refugees from a country of asylum 
to a country that has agreed to admit them, and 
eventually grant them permanent settlement) 
(UNHCR, 2015c). This chapter explores Rohingya 
refugees’ perceptions of the challenges, opportunities 
and constraints associated with these potential 
solutions.  
7.1 Repatriation 
Human rights violations against Rohingya people in 
Myanmar and the stateless status of most Rohingya 
refugees mean that repatriation is not a viable option 
for the foreseeable future. One refugee explained this 
by clearly differentiating Rohingya refugees from other 
refugees in Malaysia: 
other ethnicities like Chin, Mon, Burmese 
they can return back to Myanmar – they have 
citizenship. The Rohingya are stateless. The 
Malaysian government never recognised that the 
Rohingya are the most persecuted refugees in the 
world.
Despite limited current options for repatriation, the goal 
for numerous refugees interviewed for this study was to 
eventually return to Myanmar. As one refugee explained: 
‘One day we hope our country will get peace and we 
can return back to our motherland’. Another refugee 
also wanted to go back to Myanmar, but believed the 
decision was ultimately up to UNHCR:
I would like to go back to Myanmar. I can only 
pretend to be happy in Malaysia, because it is 
another country. Every day I face policemen, 
but at least in Malaysia the policemen are 
polite, in Myanmar they would kick and abuse 
the Rohingya people. I am now under UNHCR 
– if UNHCR told us to stay in Malaysia or go 
back to Myanmar we would have to follow this, 
because we are under UNHCR.
As illustrated by the statement above, one of the most 
salient sentiments expressed by refugees with regard 
to a durable solution was a long-standing dependence 
on UNHCR to facilitate one; as another refugee put 
it: ‘You know well how much we suffer. Only UN can 
make things better for us. We follow every instruction 
of the UN – wherever the UN throws us we will 
go’. Given their tenuous legal status and challenges 
refugees face understanding and accessing UNHCR in 
Malaysia, relying on UNHCR for a durable solution 
leaves many in a state of limbo – negotiating their lives 
on a short-term basis, with limited ability to plan for 
or control their future. 
7.2 Local integration 
Many refugees indicated that a durable solution 
would involve ‘going’ somewhere (back to Myanmar 
or resettling in a third country). Given the limited 
rights and freedoms afforded to them in Malaysia, 
few perceived local integration as a viable durable 
solution. A distinction can be made between de jure 
and de facto integration of refugees in a country of 
asylum – the former being official recognition (i.e. 
through political or legal means), and the latter being 
more informal integration at individual or community 
7  Durable solutions 
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levels. Zetter and Long (2012) argue that some degree 
of de facto integration is inevitable even when de jure 
integration is not possible.
Many examples of de facto integration emerged from 
interviews with Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. For 
example, a large number speak the local language 
and work for Malaysian employers; some refugees 
described close bonds they had formed with Malaysian 
friends and neighbours; and many refugees regularly 
attend mosques in Malaysia for prayer. Yet while 
the Rohingya practice Islam (the official religion of 
Malaysia) and religion as an institution facilitated de 
facto integration at a community level through both a 
shared system of belief and shared spaces, it was not 
enough to overcome the barriers refugees perceived 
to integration. As one young boy told a UNHCR 
evaluation team, ‘We might be the same religion as the 
local people … but we are different. We are Muslims 
but we are not Malaysians’ (Crisp et al., 2012: 12). 
A refugee interviewed for this study expressed a 
similar sentiment, stating:
The Malaysian government won’t want to keep 
us, there is no point for us to stay in Malaysia. 
If UNHCR welcomed us to a third country we 
will definitely go. Since I stay in Malaysia for 
20 years I cannot talk bad about this country. It 
seems like my home, but I do not belong to this 
country, I am a foreigner.
Another refugee interviewed said: ‘I have been here 
30 years, if I stayed another 30 years I would still 
be a refugee. My children were born here, they are 
refugees. What will the future bring?’ Fifteen years after 
Human Rights Watch published the report Living in 
Limbo: Burmese Rohingyas in Malaysia (HRW, 2000), 
thousands of Rohingya refugees remain in limbo. 
7.3 Resettlement  
In the absence of de jure integration, many Rohingya 
refugees aspire to a durable solution in the form of 
resettlement to a third country. Malaysia has one of 
UNHCR’s largest resettlement programmes,22 having 
resettled over 100,000 refugees23 to third countries 
since 2005 (UNHCR, 2015d). While many refugees 
interviewed focused their hopes for the future on 
resettlement, they identified numerous constraints and 
barriers in the bureaucratic process, including inability 
to get registered with UNHCR (without which 
they could not be considered for resettlement) and 
lack of clarity about the status of their resettlement 
application. One refugee’s resettlement processing 
had stalled following his initial interview three years 
earlier; he was not sure why and, frustrated, had 
begun to send emails, letters and faxes daily to request 
resettlement. While UNHCR confirmed they had 
received his many letters, it gave no substantive reply 
regarding the status of his application. Another refugee 
interviewed for the study said that he and his wife’s 
ultimate goal was to be resettled to a country where 
they could live peacefully. Yet while they have faxed 
many letters to UNHCR requesting resettlement, they 
claim never to have received a reply. They perceived 
the resettlement system to be unfair:
Why are new people resettled very fast but not 
us? Chin and Kachin get resettled very fast. 
We have been here for decades. Many refugees 
have been here since 1992 but newer refugees 
are called for resettlement first. We don’t know 
why – is there something wrong with us? Can 
people pay to resettle? Is it that we are poor 
and cannot pay? 
While UNHCR’s resettlement programme prioritises 
vulnerable refugees (UNHCR, 2011), these refugees 
perceived it as a programme from which only wealthy 
refugees could benefit. Yet what they attributed to 
wealth was possibly a reflection of their ethnicity 
and religion, as throughout the 2000s UNHCR 
operated what has been called a ‘differentiated (and 
arguably inequitable) approach’ (Crisp et al., 2012: 
15) to resettlement that primarily facilitated the 
resettlement of Myanmar Chin refugees (who are 
predominantly Christian, relatively recent arrivals 
to Malaysia), assuming that ‘the longer-established 
Rohingya Muslim community was better suited to 
local integration’ as a durable solution (ibid.).24 
22 In 2014, the largest number of refugees resettled with the 
assistance of UNHCR departed from Malaysia (10,976), 
followed by Turkey (8,944), Nepal (8,582), Thailand (7,170), 
Lebanon (6,285) and Kenya (4,913) (UNHCR 2015d).
23 The majority of those resettled from Malaysia were Chin 
refugees, resettled to the US.
24 It is important to recognise that states that agree to accept 
resettled refugees have a strong influence on determining 
which refugees and which categories of refugees are prioritised 
and accepted. 
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This policy changed at the end of the decade when, 
according to a report evaluating the implementation 
of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in Malaysia, 
a senior UNHCR official concluded that ‘it has 
become untenable to justify different protection 
services and access to resettlement for only some of 
the Myanmarese refugees and not others, which is 
resulting in accusations by refugee groups and NGOs 
of preferential treatment based on religious and ethnic 
grounds’ (ibid.). While Rohingya refugees are now 
being resettled from Malaysia, the legacy of this policy 
affects Rohingya refugees today: they lack the support 
of a large resettled diaspora,  and refugees who remain 
in Malaysia, particularly community leaders, cite the 
policy as indicative of more widespread inequities in 
UNHCR’s response to Rohingya refugees.  
Given the uncertainties and upheaval associated with 
the resettlement process, it is telling that refugees 
who had been in Malaysia for decades wanted to 
be resettled. One refugee who had been in Malaysia 
for 27 years found it disheartening that the future 
prospects for his children, all nine of whom had been 
born in Malaysia, were so limited: his children were 
stateless,25 unable to obtain assistance from UNHCR 
and unable to attend formal education. Another 
refugee, who had also been in Malaysia for over 20 
years, explained that, in his view, the most serious 
problem facing Rohingya refugees in Malaysia is the 
destruction of the lives of their children:
We have children born in Malaysia, with 
Malaysian birth certificates who cannot find a 
job, cannot go to school, cannot get Malaysian 
citizenship due to their parents’ status as ‘illegal 
migrants’. If those refugees give birth in a 
government hospital on the birth certificate the 
identity number is empty. Our birth certificates 
are useless. 
For the refugees interviewed, it was their inability 
to receive formal education and secondary medical 
care, and the denial of access to their fundamental 
human rights, including right to a nationality, 
freedom and hope for the future – far more than 
immediate challenges, such as difficulties meeting 
their daily subsistence needs – that compelled them 
to seek resettlement. As one refugee explained: ‘If we 
have full rights and freedoms anywhere and ability 
to improve our life I would go to that place – not 
necessarily resettle, could be Myanmar, Malaysia or 
anywhere’.
25 Babies born in Malaysian government hospitals to UNHCR-
registered refugees may be able to obtain a birth certificate, 
but the baby will not be automatically eligible for Malaysian 
citizenship – rendering them at high risk of statelessness. 
Refugees’ primary use for the certificate is as supporting 
documentation for registering the baby with UNHCR.
Amina, a married mother of three in her thirties, 
is unemployed and has been since she came to 
Malaysia 14 years ago. Amina says she cannot 
work because she has to look after her young 
children. She had hoped to send her older children 
to a Malaysian government school, but as refugee 
children are prohibited from attending Malaysian 
schools she sent them to a UNHCR-supported 
learning centre. Amina directly links education to 
hopes of a better future, noting that if she died her 
children could use the knowledge they attained in 
school to get better jobs. Her husband works as 
a parking attendant, but his salary is insufficient 
to cover the family’s needs. In addition to basic 
subsistence costs, they have to set aside money 
to bribe the police. They have no savings and must 
borrow money from Amina’s closest Rohingya 
friends or her husband’s employer to pay for 
unexpected expenses such as doctors’ fees. When 
her youngest child is old enough to go to a learning 
centre, Amina may try to find a job. For the time 
being, Amina is entirely dependent on her husband, 
who suffers from hip necrosis, a debilitating and 
painful condition that requires hip replacement 
surgery, estimated to cost RM10,000 ($2,260). 
UNHCR has recommended resettlement as 
a durable solution for the family. UNHCR 
initiated the resettlement process, and the 
case progressed to an interview with the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
However, Amina’s husband refused to be 
resettled to the United States because he had 
heard that refugees there had to work long hours 
at difficult jobs to survive, and his health condition 
would prohibit him from doing this. Although life 
in Malaysia is hard, Amina and her husband 
worry that it would be harder in the United States: 
at least in Malaysia his employer ‘knows about 
his health condition and takes pity on him’, only 
deducting some of his salary if he misses work. 
Box 8: Amina’s story
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Few Rohingya refugees perceived resettlement to be 
a panacea, and some were concerned with what they 
saw as the formidable challenges they would confront 
in the resettlement country. A common feature in 
the choices that Rohingya refugees make – including 
their decision to flee Myanmar for Malaysia, their 
livelihoods, health, education, security and durable 
solutions – is that they involve weighing perceived 
(often opaque) risks against potential benefits. The 
example in Box 8 illustrates the complex array of 
decisions confronting one Rohingya family living in 
Kuala Lumpur.
The example of Amina and her family illustrates the 
formidable array of choices confronting many refugees 
in Malaysia: there are rarely straightforward strategies 
or solutions that would enable them to achieve their 
goals or desired outcomes – most decisions require 
assessing severe risks against potential benefits, and 
accepting numerous, inhibiting trade-offs. Amina’s 
story highlights the need to better understand what 
these trade-offs are; why refugees pursue different 
opportunities and are limited by different constraints; 
and how their short- and medium-term livelihood 
strategies evolve, intersect and are prioritised in 
pursuit of long-term goals. Different refugees perceive 
the same risks and benefits in a variety of ways, 
and features of identity, individual experience and 
their unique goals heavily influence their divergent 
perceptions and subsequent livelihood strategies.  
Amina’s story illustrates how the severity of immediate 
constraints confronting many refugees (such as the 
inability to meet basic subsistence needs) prevents them 
from pursuing opportunities that may theoretically 
be available to them (such as surgery, resettlement or 
higher-paying jobs), and that would likely support their 
goals and improve long-term outcomes (better health, 
a better future for their children). This example also 
challenges the assumption – implicit in some livelihood 
interventions and support strategies targeting refugees – 
that the behaviour of refugees can or should support a 
linear, logical pursuit of the most ‘successful’ outcome, 
including a specific durable solution. Sustainable 
livelihoods frameworks, as well as findings from this 
study, highlight the importance of recognising that a 
number of potential outcomes are possible, the success 
of which is relative (depending on individual goals) and 
dependent on any number of factors (opportunities, 
constraints, perception of the institutional landscape, 
features of identity) within and beyond the control of 
an individual. 
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This report has considered policies, institutions 
and the Malaysian host environment, as seen from 
the perspective of Rohingya refugees in protracted 
displacement. The institutional landscape refugees 
described was fragmented, one in which they had 
variable knowledge of and access to essential services 
and humanitarian assistance and had to manage 
complex intra-community dynamics; this compelled 
them to take a range of steps to mitigate protection 
risks and seek sustainable livelihoods over the course 
of their (protracted) displacement. 
As this report illustrates, understanding the livelihoods 
of refugees necessitates far more than assessing 
their economic activities and outcomes – it requires 
understanding their goals, constraints, capabilities 
and strategies, and why and how they understand and 
operate within the institutional landscape. Refugees 
identified protection risks as one of the most critical 
issues affecting their livelihoods, and this report 
considered the extent of the risks and challenges 
refugees confronted on a regular basis (including being 
stopped by the authorities and detained, deported or 
forced to pay bribes), as well as the efforts they made 
to mitigate them. 
While these efforts – including learning the local 
language, negotiating and invoking sympathy – were 
highly successful in some instances, they were not a 
panacea for addressing risks posed by the authorities, 
and most refugees perceived protection risks to be an 
intractable part of their lives. While refugees expressed 
worry, disappointment and resignation about this, they 
also understood and had sympathy for the authorities, 
whom they perceived as ultimately just trying to do their 
job. Refugees were highly cognisant of the fact that their 
presence in Malaysia is considered ‘illegal’, and that 
their status rendered them unable to undertake critical 
activities (such as employment) legally and actualise 
basic rights (such as access to essential services), leaving 
them trapped in poverty and undermining their ability to 
contribute to their host society.
UNHCR ‘is not a development agency and cannot, 
in any case, afford to provide education, health 
care, shelter, and water services. It has no mandate 
for prolonged involvement in peace-building, 
reconciliation, reintegration, and return’ (Crisp et al., 
2012: S35). Yet the limited involvement of state and 
development actors in the Malaysian refugee context 
means that the burden of facilitating refugees’ access 
to essential services such as healthcare and education, 
engaging with the authorities (on an individual case 
basis and more broadly) and expanding the limited 
protection space available to refugees in Malaysia has 
fallen largely under the purview of UNHCR. 
This is untenable given the global demand and 
resource constraints facing UNHCR, and fails to 
address the needs confronting thousands of Rohingya 
people in Malaysia, some of whom are second- or 
third-generation refugees. Despite longstanding and 
in some instances innovative efforts on the part 
of UNHCR (such as the establishment of health 
insurance), refugees in Malaysia remain largely 
excluded from formal institutions. While many 
refugees access services set up by UNHCR and NGOs 
to fill gaps in state provision (such as learning centres 
and primary health clinics) there are financial and 
human costs associated with running parallel services, 
and the fact that needs dramatically exceed the 
resources available to address them raises questions 
of access and equity (Leaning, Spiegel and Crisp, 
2011). Moreover, the very existence of such services, 
though born of necessity, does nothing to allay the 
social fragmentation and exclusion that constrain the 
lives of many refugees in Malaysia. Humanitarian 
assistance cannot replace the formal engagement of 
the Malaysian government, as a significant middle-
income country and UN member state, to provide 
legal status and recognition, assistance and integration 
opportunities for refugees on its territory. 
The situation of refugees in Malaysia, and the lack 
of formal support and engagement by the Malaysian 
government to protect and assist them, highlights the 
marked discrepancy between the needs of refugees 
and responses to them, leaving refugees in a highly 
precarious position with limited integration and few of 
the benefits associated with the care and maintenance 
model of assistance and livelihood interventions 
(Crawford et al., 2015). This is particularly evident in 
8  Conclusion 
36   Livelihood strategies of Rohingya refugees in Malaysia: ‘We want to live in dignity’
the context of durable solutions. In effect, Rohingya 
refugees in Malaysia live in limbo: while some 
are in protracted displacement awaiting a durable 
solution, for most no durable solution is in sight. In 
such a context, it is necessary to focus not only on 
official durable solutions, but also on improving the 
quality of asylum protection while refugees remain in 
protracted displacement; as Zetter and Long (2012: 
35) caution: ‘the search for “solutions” overshadows 
addressing declining standards of protection within 
asylum’. Given the protracted displacement of 
Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, there is a dual need to 
address both the quality of protection during asylum, 
and long-term solutions including the possibility 
of remaining in Malaysia under a domestic, rights-
based legal regime and/or policy framework. In the 
absence of any substantial changes in state policy 
and approach to refugees, for the immediate future 
improving the lives of refugees is likely to require 
advocating for incremental improvements in the ‘grey’ 
space between official policy and how that policy is 
enacted in the lives of refugees, thousands of whom 
overcome barriers and manage to find ways to work, 
educate their children, engage with the authorities and 
integrate in Malaysian society. 
Most importantly, such solutions must be aligned 
with the lives and aspirations of refugees. In the 
words of one refugee, a 30-year-old man who worked 
numerous manual labour jobs to support his family: 
‘We are the boat people – we make a hard living here 
to survive’. Far from passively waiting for assistance 
or durable solutions, Rohingya refugees in Malaysia 
are actively pursuing goals, aspirations and economic 
activities over multiple generations of displacement. 
Improving understanding of the diverse lives and 
motivations of Rohingya refugees, and refugees in 
protracted urban displacement more broadly, is a 
critical step towards improving interventions intended 
to assist them. Interventions that aim to improve the 
status quo by providing more basic services or in-kind 
assistance, whether in the form of cash, learning 
centres or primary medical care, are helpful and in 
some cases essential, but ultimately inadequate. They 
may alleviate the immediate suffering of refugees, 
but they do little to assuage the indignity, persistent 
poverty and lack of hope that stems from severely 
limited rights and freedoms. Findings from this study 
strongly support the argument made by Landau and 
Duponchel (2011: 19) that an ‘effective approach to 
protecting urban refugees requires substantial shifts 
in the humanitarian enterprise and mindset. Although 
vulnerabilities are often sufficiently acute to warrant 
humanitarian interventions, effective protection must 
be oriented toward long-term settlement and de 
facto integration’. This will require, amongst other 
things, a shift away from conceptualising refugees as 
passive victims in need of protection or end-receivers 
(of assistance, goods and services) towards building 
favourable structural and policy environments in 
which refugees can pursue their livelihoods and goals, 
and in doing so contribute to host communities. 
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Annex 1
List of relevant treaties and conventions  
Year Treaty/convention Relevance Malaysia Thailand Indonesia  Myanmar
1949 The Fourth Geneva  Prohibits forcible displacement Y Y Y Y
 Convention Relative to  within or outside a territory
 the Protection of Civilian 
 Persons in Time of War 
1951 Convention relating to the  Defines ‘refugee’ and sets X X X X
 Status of Refugees minimum standards for their 
  treatment
1966 The International  Applies to non-citizens and has X Y Y X
 Covenant on Civil and been interpreted to prohibit the
 Political Rights return to torture
1967 Protocol relating to the  Widens the scope of the X X X X
 Status of Refugees refugee convention’s definition 
  of a refugee
1977 Additional Protocol 1 Expands protection of civilians X X X X
  provided under Parts I and III of 
  the Fourth Geneva Convention 
  to refugees and stateless persons
1984 United Nations Prohibits refoulement to contexts X Y Y X
 Convention against  where the risk of torture is
 Torture substantial
1989 Convention on the Rights  States that every child seeking Y Y Y Y
 of the Child refugee status has a right to 
  protection and humanitarian 
  assistance
1954 Convention on Stateless Sets minimum human rights X X X X
 Persons for stateless people
1961 Convention on the Aims to prevent and reduce X X X X
 Reduction of Stateless  statelessness
 Persons
1966 International Covenant Includes labour rights, the right X Y X X
 on Economic, Social and to health, the right to education, 
 Cultural Rights and the right to an adequate 
  standard of living
1969 International Convention Commits states to eliminating X Y Y X
 on the Elimination of All  racial discrimination
 Forms of Racial 
 Discrimination
1979 Convention on the Sets an agenda for action to Y Y Y Y
 Elimination of All Forms  end discrimination against women
 of Discrimination against 
 Women
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Year Treaty/convention Relevance Malaysia Thailand Indonesia  Myanmar
2000 United Nations Convention  Primary international instrument Y Y Y Y
 against Transnational  in the fight against transnational
 Organised Crime organised crime, supported by 
   relevant protocols below
2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in X Y Y Y
 Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing 
 the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
 Organised Crime
2004 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea  X Y Y Y
 and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
 against Transnational Organized Crime
1990 International Convention  Convention does not apply to X X Y X
 on the Protection of the  refugees and stateless persons, 
 Rights of All Migrant  unless such application is
 Workers and Members of  provided for in the relevant
 Their Families national legislation of, or 
   international instruments in 
   force for, the state concerned
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Annex 2
An operational map for research using a Sustainable  
Livelihoods Framework
Identity
Gender, age, education, ethnicity, 
experiences, etc.
Context, processes and trends
Politics (regional/national/local), trends 
and dynamics of violence/insecurity, trends 
(demographic, economic, etc.), media, etc.
Institutions/policies
Formal policies (government), cultural 
rules, kinship ties, impersonal institutions 
(e.g. markets, etc.
Assets and vulnerabilities
P
O
W
E
R
 R
E
L
A
T
IO
N
S
Livelihood strategies
Livelihood strategies
Activities
(actual performance)
Outcomes
Perception 
of context 
and risks
Perception 
of livelihood 
possibilities
Source: Levine, 2014: 10
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